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Complaisance and An Analysis of Manufacturer and
Physician Liability'
0F THE MANY BIRTH CONTROL TECHNIQUES currently in use,2 per-
haps the most controversial is the intrauterine device (IUD).3
Although not a widely accepted method of contraception until the
late 1960s, 4 the concept of inserting a foreign object into the vagina
to prevent conception is by no means novel to our times. For centuries
Arabian and Turkish camel drivers have inserted small stones into
the uteri of their saddle camels prior to embarking on caravans in
1Since there are no reported cases involving intratuterine devices at the present time
(although there are numerous actions pending throughout the nation), the discussion in
this note will be based primarily on the information brought out at the hearings con-
ducted by the Hon. H. L. Fountain of North Carolina on May 30, 31 and June 1, 12,
13, 1973, Hearings on Intrauterine Contraceptive Devices Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Fountain Hearings].
2The methods are abstention; coitus interruptus; the rhythym system; diaphraghms; con-
doms; the pill; the mini-pill; the IUD; tubal ligation; vasectomy; and the many vaginal
foams, creams and jellies. Also in use are two so-called "just-in-case measures," the
morning-after pill and menstrual extraction.
In addition to the extensive examination of the IUD industry conducted by Representative
Fountain, supra note 1, Senator Edward Kennedy devoted a portion of his hearings on
the medical device industry solely to the IUD, Hearings on Medical Device Amendments,
1973 before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (hereinafter cited as Kennedy Hearings]. Moreover, several
women's organizations, including the Coalition for Medical Rights of Women, have
petitioned the California Department of Health for stringent regulation of IUD sales in
that state, N. Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1974, at 14, col. 3. A formal evidentiary public hearing
to discuss the Department's proposed draft of regulations relating to ILDs was held
in San Francisco on March 5, 1975. Letter from Ms. Erica Black Grubb, attorney for the
Coalition for Medical Rights of Women, Feb. 20, 1975, on file in the Cleveland State
Law Library. See also Le Roux, Suits evoke liability furor over birth control IUD, Bus.
INS., Sept. 16, 1974, at 10; Katz, An IUD, Safety, and 'Sound, Scientific Principles',
NAT'L OBSERVER, Sept. 7, 1974, at 10; N. Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1974, at 17, col. 1; A
Plague of Problems, FORBES, Aug. 15, 1974, at 35; Doubts About IUDs, TIME, July
15, 1974, at 81; Brody, Birth-Curb Group Acts On IUD Risk, N.Y. Times, May 30,
1974, at 17, col. 1; N. Y. Times, May 29, 1974, at 49, col. 1. For a listing of the many
discussions on IUDs in the scientific literature, see the extensive bibliographies contained
in the Fountain Hearings at 67-72, 480-98, 509-14.
4 It was at this time that the Advisory Committee on Obstetrics and Gynecology of the
Food and Drug Administration made their Report on Intrauterine Contraceptive Devices,
(Continued on next page)
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an effort to prevent the animals from copulating.5 Moreover, the
IUD is mentioned in both the Talmud and the writings of Hippocrates
as a potential method of controlling fertility.6 . However, even in
these early historical stages there must have been doubts about the
IUD's efficacy and safety, for it is reported that Cleopatra preferred
the use of a sponge soaked in vinegar to the insertion of a device.7
In the late nineteenth century IUDs composed of metal were first
introduced. While these early devices (now termed "first genera-
tion") 8 were at first widely extolled in scientific writings,9 by 1930
the medical profession had concluded that the IUD's propensity to
to harm far outweighted its utility.1 0 From 1930 to 1958 the medical
profession expressed little interest in the IUD as a feasible method
of birth control; but with the invention, in 1959, of a new polyethelene
device1 there grew a resurgence of interest and revitalization of
research efforts.1 2 Within five years this "second generation" IUD13
(Continued from preceding page)
in Fountain Hearings at 431. The Advisory Committee found "adequate scientific data
attesting the effectiveness and utility of the intrauterine device." Id. at 441. See also
Hilgers, The Intrauterine Device: Contraceptive or Abortifacient?, in Fountain Hearings
at 499-500 for an historical survey of the tests conducted on, and the medical profession's
feeling about, the IUD prior to the 1960's [hereinafter cited as Hilgers].
sHilgers, supra note 4, at 499. The insertion of the stone into the camel's uterus was to
"repulse the advances of the male as if the female were pregnant." Id.
6 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY OF THE FDA, REPORT ON
INTRAUTERINE CONTRACEPTIVE DEVICES, in Fountain Hearings at 431, 436 (hereinafter
cited as ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY OF THE FDA] A
Plague of Problems, FORBES, Aug. 15, 1974, at 35.
7 A Plague of Problems, FORBES, Aug. 15, 1974, at 35.
8 Ostergard, Intrauterine Contraception in Nulliparas with the Dalkon Shield, 116 AM. J.
OB. GYN. 1088 (1973). The first generation IUDs were primarily those patterned after
the Graefenberg ring, and, as the author points out, were not adaptable to the nulliparous
female (women who have never born children).
9 The extensive writings on IUDs during this period generally discussed their utility not
as a form of contraception or birth control but rather as a method for correction of
uterine displacement. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY OF
THE FDA, supra note 6, at 436.
70 The severe and often fatal pelvic infections associated with the metallic intra-
uterine contraceptive devices used in the 1920's and early 1930's led to almost
uniform condemnation of this method of contraception.
Marshall, Hepler & Jinguji, Fatal Streptococcus Pyogenes Septicemia Associated with an
Intrauterine Device, 41 OB. GYN. 83 (1973). See also ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF
OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY OF THE FDA, supra note 6, at 431, 436; Hilgers, supra
note 4, at 499, 500.
" Japanese scientists were among the first to use inert plastic materials for IUDs, and tests
done by Ota and Ishihama, in 1959, helped revive interest. Also, the development of new
insertion techniques which did not require dilatation of the cervix helped advance the
proposition that this form of birth control was now more feasible. ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY OF THE FDA, supra note 6, at 431, 436.
12 Hilgers, supra note 4, at 499, 500. This was also the year in which Dr. W. Oppenheimer
of Israel and Dr. A. Ishihama of Japan published studies showing IUD as safe, reliable
and effective, and by so doing "the door was open for a 'reevaluation.' " Id. See Ishihama,
Clinical Studies on Intrauterine Rings Especially the Present State of Contraception in
Japan and the Experiences in the Use of Intrauterine Rings, 10 YOKOHAMA MED. BULL.
89 (1959); Oppenheimer, Prevention of Pregnancy by the Graefenberg Ring Method: A
Re-evaluation After 28 Years' Experience, 78 AM. J. OB. GYN. 446 (1959) (author
described experiences over a 28 year period with a silkworm gut ring and concluded that
the method was "absolutely harmless").
13 Ostergard, supra note 8, at 1088.
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slowly gained in popularity, 4 primarily through the efforts of the
World Population Council in underdeveloped areas of the world.1 5
In the United States, the impetus for acceptance was provided by
the Senate Hearings on Oral Contraceptives conducted in early
1970.16 The adverse publicity received by the pill in those hearings
engendered such a panic that an estimated one million women ceased
using oral contraceptives within the six month period following the
hearings. 17 For many of these women the IUD appeared to be the
only suitable alternative, especially since testimony in the Nelson
Hearings had depicted the IUD as a safe, viable substitute for the
pill.18 Thus, by the end of 1970 over three million American women
-- and twelve million around the world - were fitted with a device.' 9
While undeniably an alternative method of birth control was
needed for those women who had foregone the pill, it is indeed
questionable that the IUD was the logical choice. Medical scientists
even today know neither how the IUD works 20 nor the extent or
gravity of its possible (or for that matter probable) adverse effects. 2'
Since the reason for the abandonment of the pill by so many women
after the Nelson Hearings was the fear of possible adverse effects,
it is indeed a curious phenomenon that this method of birth control
14 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY OF THE FDA, supra note
6; Hilgers, supra note 4.
Is The Rockefeller Foundation founded the Population Council in 1952 to study population
growth, and in 1962 it held the first International IUD Conference which was attended
by representatives from eleven countries. The second conference was held in 1964 and
was attended by 500 participants from 44 countries. Hilgers, supra note 4, at 500, 501.
16 Hearings on Safety of Oral Contraceptives Before a Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate
Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, vol. 1, at 5921 (1970).
17 Statement of Russel J. Thomsen, M.D., in Fountain Hearings at 143.
18 Statement of Larry R. Pilot, Director, Division of Compliance, Office of Medical Devices,
in Fountain Hearings at 249; Letter from John G. Madry, M.D. to Louis M. Wellman,
M.D., Sept. 18, 1970, in Fountain Hearings at 24.
19 Statement of Sherwin Gardner, Acting Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, in
Fountain Hearings at 198-99.
20 Hilgers, supra note 4, at 499, 501. It is unclear whether the IUD should be termed a
contraceptive or an abortifacient. If a contraceptive, then the IUD prevents conception;
if an abortifacient, then the IUD is an agent which induces abortion after conception.
Under either definition there are numerous theories as to how the IUD performs its
function, but with the present inadequate data there is no general consensus. It is
interesting to note that the World Health Organization, the scientific group which
accepted for the medical profession the name IUD, rejected unanimously the name IUCD
(intrauterine contraceptive device), thus at least implying their doubts as to its contra-
ceptive propensity. Dr. Thomas Hilgers, a fellow in obstetrics and gynecology at the Mayo
Graduate School of Medicine, after an exhaustive review of every available scientific study
on human subjects wearing intrauterine devices, has concluded that the IUD is an
abortifacient. Id. at 508.
21 The problem of discovering the scope of the adverse effects lies in the area of reporting,
for "gynaecological patients are loyal creatures, and do not like to upset the kind doctors
who fitted the device by recounting a failure." Letter from Dr. Dennis F. Hawkins,
Institute of Obstetrics and Gynecology, University of London, to the Editor of the
British Medical Journal, in Fountain Hearings at 314. See Statement of Senator Gaylord
Nelson, in Fountain Hearings at 46; Note, The Effectiveness of FDA Medical Device
Legislation, 7 U.C.D.L. REV. 293 (1974).
19751
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
became the substitute for the pill and gained such widespread accep-
tance. This development is especially perplexing in view of the
medical profession's universal rejection of first generation IUDs
only a few years earlier.
The post-Nelson acceptance of the IUD, when contrasted with the
dearth of medical knowledge, becomes more readily comprehensible
when the industry's practices are examined; from such an analysis
two main reasons explaining the industry's ability to command accep-
tance of the IUD are immediately discernable. First, since the IUD
is classified as a device rather than a drug,22 the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) may not impose any pre-marketing controls
on the manufacturing, testing, or distribution processes. 23 Thus an
IUD manufacturer need not fear governmental intervention regard-
ing the sufficiency of the testing of the device; a situation that would
be encountered if the IUD were classified by the FDA as a drug.
Second, the margin of profit available to an IUD manufacturer is
enormous. When manufactured in large lots, an IUD is produced for
about thirty-five cents, while the price to the physician is three dollars
and fifty cents - a mark-up of one thousand percent.24 Added to this
sum, the patient must then pay the physician an average of thirty-
five dollars for the insertion. 25 This potential for profit,26 coupled
with the paucity of governmental control, provides little incentive,
indeed, for pre-market testing27 and much compulsion for glib over-
promotion. 28 With this backdrop, then, it is not the least bit suprising
that the number of IUD users had risen to an estimated thirty million
by 1973.29
22 21 C.F.R. § 310.502 (1974). See note 72 infra for a summary of the regulation's provisions.
See also Statement of Sherwin Gardner, Acting Commissioner, Food and Drug Administra-
tion, in Fountain Hearings at 199.
23 See text accompanying notes 55-60 infra
M' Statement of Russel J. Thomsen, M.D., in Fountain Hearings at 58.
25 Id. at 56. Dr. Thomsen's figure was arrived at by surveying physicians in the metropolitan
Washington area. He further testified that the actual insertion of the IUD takes about
five minutes. See also THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, OUR BODIES,
OUR SELVES: A BOOK BY AND FOR WOMEN 123 (1973) (stating that the cost of an
insertion in the Boston area is $35-$50 and $50-$100 in the New York City area).
26 IUDs are manufactured and used by the millions. Companies in the United
States have produced 30 million IUDs for both domestic and foreign sales
since 1959.
Statement of Russel J. Thomsen, M.D., in Kennedy Hearings, supra note 3, at 368. Further
proof of the magnitude of the market is evidenced by the fact that there were, in 1973,
over 70 models of IUDs, and the number was still "sprouting." Statement of Louis B.
Tryer, M.D., Project Director, Family Planning Division, The American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, in Fountain Hearings at 384.
2 See text beginning at note 124 infra, for a discussion of the importance of pre-marker
testing.
28For examples of the promotional literature see Fountain Hearings at 73-108. One
physician has charged that these promotional tactics have forced American physicians to
"unwittingly become participants in a great experiment in population control, utilizing
as experimental subjects patients for whom the IUD was not even the prime target for
usage." Statement of John G. Madry, M.D., in Fountain Hearings at 11.
29 Statement of Russel J. Thomsen, M.D., in Fountain Hearings at 368.
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The switch from the pill, however, has not been without adverse
consequences to the IUD user. Testimony at the Fountain Hearings
30
on IUDs in mid-1973 and complaints received by the FDA in the past
several years 31 have revealed a plethora of untoward reactions ex-
perienced by numerous users,3 2 the most catastrophic of which have
resulted in death.33 Among the more severe effects have been acute
pelvic infection, 34 perforation of the uterine wall with migration of
the IUD into the abdominal cavity or into the intestines necessitating
30 For examples of testimony enumerating the adverse reactions to IUDs see Fountain
Hearings at 9-10, 42-43, 50-56, 109-114, 440-41, 460-61, 463-65. When reviewing the
testimony the terms "adverse effect" and "contraindication" should not be confused. An
adverse effect is a result contrary to the one intended or desired and detrimental to the
patient's will being. A contraindication refers to a "special sympton or circumstance that
renders the use of a remedy or the carrying out of a procedure inadvisable." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 283 (3d Lawyers ed. 1972).
Contraindications for the IUD are:
Contraindications . . . include evidence of known or suspected pregnancy;
acute or subacute pelvic inflammatory disease; history of incompacitating
dysmenorrhea or menorrhagia; known or suspected cervical or uterine malig-
nancy; hypoplasia or distortion of the uterine cavity; cervical stenosis; or
abnormal Papanicolau smears.
Kennedy Hearings, supra note 3, at 591.
31 Copies of the FDA Complaint File, complete through July 1974, were made available
to the Cleveland State Law Review by Paul D. Rheingold, Esq. [hereinafter cited as
FDA Complaint File]. Copies of the File may be obtained directly from the FDA.
32 "The Cumulated Index Medicus, 1972" has 59 listings under Adverse Effects of IUDs,
Fountain Hearings at 9-10. In addition to those adverse reactions mentioned in this note
are numerous allegations in the FDA Complaint File that the IUD: has caused excessive
bleeding; has caused excessive and protracted pain, often necessitating removal; and has
embedded in the uterine wall. See also Deming, Ls Loop; Medicolegal Aspects, 16 MED.
TRIAL TECH. Q. 1 (March, 1970).
33The mortality rate associated with the use of IUDs is 31.6/100,000, as compared to
3/100,000 for the pill. Fountain Hearings at 27-28. Although the exact number of
deaths directly attributable to the IUD is unknown, a letter from Raymon B. Wait, M.D.,
of the Mead Research Center to John G. Madry, Jr., M.D., February 18, 1970 is illumin-
ating for its inclusion of the following table from the May 8, 1969 issue of the New
England Journal of Medicine:
Risks of Pregnancy Per Million Reproductive Age Women Per Year
Deaths
Due to
complications Due to Total
Method Pregnancies of pregnancy method deaths
IUD ............. 50,000 12 to 60 24 40 to 80
The pill ........... 10,000 3 to 15 12 to 24 15 to 40
Fountain Hearings at 19. See also Marshall, Hepler & Jinguji, supra note 10, at 83; Scott,
Critical Illnesses and Deaths Associated with Intrauterine Devices, 31 OB. GYN. 322,
323-26 (1968); Tsukada, Ectopic Pregnancy Associated with Use of an Intrauterine Con-
traceptive Device - Report of Two Cases in which Autopsies Were Performed, 204
J.A.M.A. 331 (1968) (two cases where IUD users died as a result of hemorraging that
could have been prevented if the correct diagnosis had been made; but suggesting that the
difficulty in diagnosis was attributable in part to the presence of the IUD).
3 For two case studies of serious infections (pelvic abscess) caused by an IUD see Wilson
& Dilts, Unusual Complication of an Intrauterine Contraceptive Device, 112 AM. J. OB.
GYN. 237 (1972) (two case studies illustrate the potential severe complications that
may result from the supposedly "minor" infections commonly associated with the IUD).
IUDs
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surgical removal, 35 ectopic pregnancy,36 and septic spontaneous abor-
tion.37 It has also been alleged that IUD users have an average men-
strual blood loss more than twice that of non-users,38 a reaction which
can lead to secondary anemia and is particularly undesireable among
teenagers and nutritionally deficient populations. 39 An additionally
distressing feature has been the allegation that the pregnancy rate
among IUD users may be as high as ten percent 40 in spite of the fact
that manufacturers promise a rate in the area of one or two percent.4 1
In addition to the adverse effects attributable to the unknown
workings of an IUD on the female physiology, the defects in IUDs
qua IUDs have not gone without notice. The FDA has received
numerous reports of instances in which removal strings have broken
upon attempted removal; devices have become disengaged from the
inserter before they were completely in place, high in the fundal
cavity; devices have broken during insertion or removal; and some
devices have been so radiolucent that they could not be located by
3 As with all the data concerning percentages for untoward effects, the recorded percentages
for perforation instances varies. The Advisory Committee reported instances varying
from .04% to .9%, Fountain Hearings at 460. Other reporters have found much higher
percentages, one finding that "about two percent ... may have migration . . . into the
abdomen or pelvis . . . and such migration may require immediate surgery for its
removal .. " Deming, supra note 32, at 2. Perforation of the wall apparently occurs in
one of three ways: the physician is negligent in his insertion technique and perforates
the uterus; the design of the IUD and insertor is such that perforation is caused upon
insertion regardless of the physician's due care; or, the IUD migrates after insertion and
subsequently pierces the uterine wall. For reports of perforation cases see Sprague &
Jenkins, Perforation of the Uterus with a Shield Intrauterine Device, 41 OB. GYN. 80
(1973); Deming, supra note 32, at 1.
36An ectopic pregnancy can be described as the development of an impregnated ovum
occurring in the cervical canal, the fallopian tube, an ovarian follicle, the peritoneal
cavity or any other site outside the uterine cavity. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
1013-14 (3d Lawyers ed. 1972). Ectopic pregnancies occur in about 1 out of 300
pregnancies when no IUD is in situ and always require major surgery and often require
blood transfusions, "and must be considered a threat to the life and future fertility of
the woman." Fountain Hearings at 51. Approximately one out of twenty pregnancies
occurring with an IUD is situ is ectopic, but the Advisory Committee reported that
"there is no evidence that the presence of an IUD can cause a conceptus to implant
ectopically. The high relative frequency of tubel pregnancies results from the successful
prevention of most uterine pregnancies." Fountain Hearings at 461. Thus whether or not
the presence of an IUD is causative has not conclusively been demonstrated, for as the
Advisory Committe states "there is no evidence" to support the hypothesis that IUDs cause
ectopic pregnancies. But others disagree. See Hilgers, supra note 4, at 507.
3 A spontaneous abortion is one not artifically induced, and a septic abortion is an infected
abortion complicated by fever, endometrities, and parametritis. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 3 (3d Laywers ed. 1972). Therefore a septic spontaneous abortion is a
natural abortion inducted by infection.
38 Statement of Russel J. Thomsen, M.D., in Fountain Hearings at 54. This is an especially
dangerous problem for there is no quantitative methodology for measuring blood loss.
Testimony by Jack Freund, M.D., in Fountain Hearings at 331.
31 Statement of Russel J. Thomsen, M.D., in Fountain Hearings at 54.
40 Statement of Louise B. Tyrer, M.D., Project Director, Family Planning Division, The
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, in Fountain Hearings at 367. Even
this high percentage is not conclusive as being the outer limits of failure as shown by
the various testimonies and data presented throughout the Fountain Hearings.
4' Id.
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x-ray after migration had occurred. 42 Although these malfunctions
appear quite innocuous compared to the aforementioned adverse
effects, it must be remembered that in most instances they necessitate
surgical procedures which can be as costly as they are dangerous.
3
It is difficult to understand how a product so intimately connected
with a bodily function and presenting such a potential for serious
harm was allowed on the market without pre-market clearances
assuring that it had met at least minimum standards of safety. This
development is especially distressing since there exists a governmental
agency whose sole function is to protect the public interest in pre-
cisely this type of situation. Since the law of products liability should
not deny a remedy to the unwary consumer whose reliance on the
overzealous representations of the manufacturer ended in tragedy,
this note will examine the conduct of the FDA and FTC in light of
existing legislation and case law in an effort to ascertain whether
they have adhered to the mandate of Congress, and analyze the
potential liability of the IUD manufacturer and the prescribing
physician in light of the present law of products liability.
The Government
The purpose of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 44 is to
protect the health and safety of the American consumer from
products falling within certain enumerated classifications that are
found to be unsafe. All foods, drugs and cosmetics are covered, as
are medical devices, however, the Act grants the FDA more authority
to control some classifications than others. While drugs and medical
devices are both given treatment under the Act, the breadth of permis-
sible controls accorded the FDA varies greatly between these two
categories; the device controls are not nearly as extensive. This
variance in FDA powers, dependent on whether a product is deemed
a device or a drug, is most critical since the Act's definitions of drugs
42 FDA Complaint File, supra note 31. Some of the other more prominent complaints,
against the device itself, appearing in the FDA files were: calcification of the IUD
leading to difficult removal; strings remaining in the uterus after removal; strings become
detached while the IUD is in situ; inserters bending on insertion; IUDs not disengaging
on insertion; strings disappearing making it impossible to check if IUDs are correctly
positioned; often unable to remove the IUD without surgery; if string is multifilament it
may contribute to infection. Furthermore, the utilization of x-rays for locating a migrating
IUD is itself not without complications. The x-rays, if they show the IUD at all, will show
where the IUD was on the day the x-ray was taken, and if the day is not the same as the
day of the surgery the IUD's location may be different. Moreover, the possibility of
endangering a developing fetus by the use of x-rays is an always present problem. Deming,
supra note 32, at 5.
43 If the IUD has perforated the uterus and migrated into the abdomen, the "costs of
surgical removal and hospitalization covering that event could easily run to $1,000.
The same could be said for an IUD assiocated tubal pregnancy or incomplete mis-
carriage." Statement of Russel J. Thomsen, M.D., in Fountain Hearings at 57.
4'21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1970).
19751
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and devices are barely distinguishable. As will be seen, this situation
can often lead to drastic consequences for the consumer.
When the product in question has been classified as a drug, the
Act gives a diligent FDA ample authority to ensure that minimal
standards of safety have been met before the product is placed on
the market. 45 If the drug is not exempted by the grandfather clause,
46
the manufacturer must file a new drug application with the FDA.
47
This application is designed to ensure that, prior to marketing, ade-
quate scientific and medical evidence exists establishing the product's
safety and efficacy. The information submitted to the FDA is com-
posed of toxicology studies on animals, human pharmacological studies
in controlled populations, and precise formulation and manufacturing
information.4 Prior to giving formal approval the FDA must also
approve all labels, 49 labelling,50 and prospective advertisements. 51
4521 U.S.C. § 355 (1970).
46The grandfather clause is contained in 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1) (1970), quoted in part at
note 47 infra.
4121 U.S.C. § 355 (a) (1970) gives the FDA authority to monitor new drugs prior to
marketing in interstate commerce:
No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce
any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to subsection
(b) of this section is effective with respect to such drug.
A "new drug" is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 32 1(p) (1970):
(1) Any drug . . . the composition of which is such that such drug is not
generally recognized, among experts qualifed by scientific training and experience
to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for the use
under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling
thereof, except that such a drug not so recognized shall not be deemed to be a
"new drug" if at any time prior to the enactment of this chapter it was subject
to the Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, as amended, and if at such time
its labeling contained the same representations concerning the conditions of its
use; or
(2) Any drug . . . the composition of which is such that such drug, as a
result of investigations to determine its safety and effectiveness for use under
such conditions, has become so recognized, but which has not, otherwise than in
such investigations been used to a material extent or for a material time under
such conditions.
4 Radzius, The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act - Drug or Device?, 8 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 527, 530 (1972). See Note, Liability of Birth Control Pill Manufacturers, 23
HAST. L.J. 1526, 1532-33 (1972). See also Cooper, Device Legislation, 26 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L. J. 165, 166 (1971) wherein five steps are listed as "accepted scientific practice":
First, new drugs are tested in animals; second, there is limited clinical testing
in humans; third, there is broader testing in larger human populations; fourth,
developers have their data reviewed informally by their scientific peers through
the literature; fifth, data is given formal review by Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) specialists under the new drug provisions of the Act. The aim of the
process is to protect patient, physician and the public from unsafe and ineffective
drugs. Government involvement is based on the notion that the public cannot
protect itself alone; that the nature of drug action is too complicated a process
for any but experts to judge.
49 A "label" is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321(k) (1970) as "a display of written, printed, or
graphic matter upon the immediate container of any article ....... This definition is
applicable to devices as well as drugs.
50 21 U.S.C. § 355 (b) (1970). The definition of "labeling," applicable to drugs and devices,
is different and more encompassing that "label" is found in 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (1970)
("The term 'labeling' means all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matter (1)
upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article").
See also Davis, Labeling Requirements for Medical Devices, 27 FOOD DRUG CosM. L. J.
(Continued on next page)
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Even after approval is given, however, the FDA retains a con-
tinuing jurisdiction. All adverse reactions experienced by the general
population that are brought to the manufacturer's attention must be
adequately recorded and are subject to FDA review.52 Moreover,
every drug manufacturer is required to register with the FDA
annually,53 and his establishment is subjected to an inspection at least
biennially to ensure his compliance with good manufacturing prac-
tices. 54 Although this policing task is monumental in relation to the
number of drugs on the market, when properly performed, it does
have the effect of ensuring that minimal health and safety standards
are met before a product achieves general distribution.
Medical devices, on the other hand, are controlled by statutory
powers that the FDA can exert only after-the-fact. 55 There are no
requirements that a manufacturer of a medical device establish its
safety or efficacy prior to marketing. Once the manufacturer has
convinced himself and the medical profession that his product is safe
and effective, the device can be successfully marketed. 56 These prob-
lems are further complicated by the FDA's lack of authority to police
ante or post marketing advertisements for products classified as de-
vices, but this function is within the domain of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). These restrictions result in the confinement of
FDA regulatory efforts to the policing of device labels and labeling.
5 7
(Continued from preceding page)
608, 610 (1972) wherein the author, the Director of the Division of Scientific Review,
Office of Medical Devices, states:
Labeling also includes oral presentations and reprints of scientific or clinical
reports published in professional journals or other scientific publications used
for promotional purposes. Reprints used as promotional material constitute label-
ing for the product. The distributor of promotional material should realize
that he, through this use, is assuming the responsibility for the factuality,
truthfulness, and scientific validity of the author's report.
51 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1970); Radzius, supra note 48, at 530.
52 it is a prohibited act under 21 U.S.C. § 331 (e) (1970) for a drug manufacturer to fail
to keep adequate records; and, the power to inspect is granted to the FDA under 21 U.S.C.
§ 374(a) (2) (1970). See also Note, supra note 21, at 296.
- 21 U.S.C. § 360(b) (1970).
u 21 U.S.C. § 360(h) (1970); Radzius, supra note 48, at 530.
SSHutt, What is a Device?, 27 FoOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 617, 620-21 (1972).
s6 Radzius, Medical Devices and Judicial Legislation, 27 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 639, 641
(1972).
57 The provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, applicable to devices, are: 21 U.S.C.
§ 351 (1970) (adulterated devices - if IUD has been "prepared, packed, or held under
unsanitary conditions .... "; 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1970) (misbranded devices - if IUD
has false or misleading labeling; if labeling does not bear "adequate directions for use"
or "adequate warnings"; if device is dangerous to health when used with the frequency or
duration prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof).
There is an exemption for those prescription devices sold only to physicians, in 21
C.F.R. § 1.106(d) (1974), which enables the manufacturer to direct the "adequate
directions for use" not to the patient but rather to the physician, and compliance is met if
(Continued on next page)
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The effect of this statutory aberration is that the American consumer
may be subjected to untested and unsafe medical devices while the
FDA, in its efforts to remove the unsafe devices from the market,
is forced to assume the unseemly role of data collector until it has
accumulated sufficient evidence to sustain a court action against the
manufacturer.58 This task is often rendered extremely difficult because
manufacturers of medical devices are not required to maintain con-
tinuing records of misadventures with their products, nor are they
required to report such mishaps to the FDA.
5 9
With these distinct advantages accorded the device manufacturer
- at the expense of the American consumer - it is understandable
why, if given a choice, most manufacturers would prefer to have
their product classified as a device rather than a drug. Unfortunately,
in all close questions, the existing legislation allows the achievement
of just such a result since the manufacturer is allowed to make the
initial determination as to the classification of his product; he need
simply market the product as a device without prior consultation with
the FDA. Since there are no device pre-marketing controls, in those
situations where the FDA is unaware of the manufacturer's plans
to market, there is no way to stop a manufacturer from implementing
his plan. Unfortunately, the only recourse open to the government is
an after-the-fact reclassification. 60
(Continued from preceding page)
Labeling on or within the package from which the device is to be dispensed
bears information for use, including indications, effects, routes, methods, and
frequency and duration of administration, and any relevant hazards, contraindica-
tions, side effects, and precautions under which practitioners licensed by law to
administer the device can use the device safely and for the purpose for which
it is intended, including all purposes for which it is advertised or represented.
S Hutt, supra note 55, at 620-21. The evidence that must be documented is that the
device "is being sold or offered for sale under false and misleading claims, that it is
adulterated, or that it is unsafe for the intended use." Id. at 621.
s Statement of Sherwin Gardner, Acting Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration,
in Fountain Hearings at 180:
However, the FDA has no statutory authority to require premarket clearance
for a product classified as a device regardless of the potential impact of a device
on the quality of life. Also, the FDA has no statutory authority to:
Require registration of manufacturers of devices;
Compel the disclosure of complaints transmitted to manufacturers;
Require the maintenance of records and submission of reports (including
clinical studies of safety and efficacy) by manufacturers, and has no statutory
authority;
Require the repair, replacement or return of violative devices.
60 Radzius, supra note 56, at 641. Mr. Radzius, counsel for a device manufacturer, contends
that this system should not be changed and more stringent controls should not be
afforded to the Food and Drug Administration because "the decision to use most devices
is made by the physician, who relies on the manufacturer's information and the medical
literature. Anyone demanding stringent regulatory control of devices risks implying care-
lessness on the part of the physician and the medical journals alike." Id. However, if the
manufacturer advertises in a medical journal and does so in a manner intending to mis-
lead the physician (i.e., if the data used has been doctored or at least censored by the
manufacturer so that only the most favorable tests are used in the advertisement) then
(Continued on next page)
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The problem of distinguishing drugs from devices under the Act
evidences both the careless draftsmanship of Congress and the need
for new legislation in this area.6' Under the Act, drugs are defined
as "articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat-
ment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals," or " articles
(other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of
the body of man or other animals."62 The definition of devices is
identical, with the exception that the word "articles" is replaced by the
words "instruments, apparatus, or contrivances. ' 63 Hence, the man-
ufacturer of an "article" must secure pre-marketing approval from
the FDA, while the manufacturer of an "instrument, apparatus, or
contrivance" need not.64
Needless to say, this unfortunate phraseology has engendered
much litigation, especially with respect to those products whose
efficacy and safety might not surpass the minimal standards of a
new drug application and hence are deemed, by the manufacturer,
(Continued from preceding page)
surely the physician can not be deemed careless for his reliance on such misinformation
for he has no other means at his disposal to derive more accurate information. This is a
deplorable situation and unless the FDA or the FTC has notice of such misinformation
(FDA for labeling; FTC for periodical), then no action will be taken. This situation is
unlike the one when the labeling and advertisements for drugs, because of stringent pre-
marketing controls, must first be censored by the FDA, and no misstatements will be
allowed to reach the physician.
Further, reliance upon the medical press is often erroneous even in the area of drugs.
Certain abuses have also been laid at the doorstep of the medical press. Thus,
articles which the medical journals carry about new drugs still in their ex-
perimental stage, highly influential upon physicians reading them, may at times
be more favorable than the intermediate results indicate, or may be the report
of but one out of many experiments performed, or one not done according to
exacting scientific principles. Even worse, it was recently demonstrated that some
medical journals, which by virtue of their ownership are the captives of certain
drug houses, have opened their pages to inaccurately platitudinous articles on
the "miracle" effects of new drugs.
Rheingold, Products Liability - The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RUTGERS
L. REV. 947, 959 (1964).
61 The impetus for the drafters of new device legislation was a call by President Nixon in
1969 in his consumer message to Congress for more stringent device standards. Statement
of Senator Gaylord Nelson, in Fountain Hearings at 46; Link, Cooper Committee Report
and Its Effect on Current FDA Medical Device- Activities, 27 FOOD DRUG COSM. L. J.
624 (1972). Numerous bills have been introduced in both the House and Senate, but
at the present time the powerful manufacturing lobbyists have consistently defeated the
consumer's rights.
6221 U.S.C. §321(g) (6) (B), (C) (1970).
6321 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1970).
6Davidson, Preventive "Medicine" For Medical Devices: Is Further Regulation Required?,
55 MARQ. L. REV. 405, 405-06 (1972):
This definitional dichotomy has caused much confusion and created significant
problems of statutory construction for the courts. Moreover, this dichotomy,
whereby "new drugs" are subject to premarket regulation but new "devices" are
not, provides a loophole permitting people to be directly or indirectly injured
or otherwise harmed by medical devices which are unsafe or ineffective (or
both) for their intended use.
See also Rheingold, IUDs: A Federal Loophole, TRIAL, Nov./Dec., 1974, at 39.
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devices. 65 A welcome by-product of this often protracted litigation
between the FDA and members of the industry,66 however, has been
judical interpretation of the breadth of power actually possessed by
the FDA to reclassify. It has been held that the purpose of the Act
is to be the guiding principle when any determination is to be made
as to whether a product is a drug or device.67 The FDA, then, must
be ever mindful of its raision d'etre, even though, from the manu-
facturer's perspective, this might result in some rather perverted
classifications. Thus, through utilization of the courts, the FDA has
been sustained in its attempts to reclassify as drugs a tampon, 68 a
sterile gauze bandage, 69 a nylon ligature loop,70 and an antibiotic
sensitivity disk (a product which never touches the human body).71
65 Classification by a manufacturer of a product as a device rather than a drug will bypass
the new drug application requirements unless the FDA challenges the classification and
is successful in reclassification. For example of reclassification see notes 67-70 infra. For a
very good explanation of the methods utilized by the FDA to remove hazardous devices
from the market, instead of even attempting to reclassify, see Butts, Legal Proceedings, 27
FOOD DRUG COSM. L. J. 601 (1972).
66 Litigation against device manufacturers for alleged violations of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act can be drawn out almost indefinitely with the American consumer bearing
the brunt of the harm for the violation in the interim. United States v. Diapulse Corp.
of America, 427 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1972) is illustrative. In Diapulse the FDA deemed the
article a misbranded device and seized it as such in 1965, and in 1967 a jury found the
device to be misbranded. United Sttaes v. Diapulse Mfg. Corp. of American, 269 F. Supp.
162 (D. Conn. 1967). The petitioner appealed and the lower court's decision was affirmed.
United States v. Diapulse Mfg. Corp. of America, 389 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 907 (1968). However, because the FDA allowed the petitioner three years to
comply with the labeling requirements of the Act, it was not until 1971 that a move for
active enforcement of the earlier granted injunction was made. Then, in holding that the
lower court had considered the correct factors in issuing the preliminary injunction, the
injunction was finally enforced. Thus, even utilizing the court system for enforcement
it took seven years to force compliance. And during the seven year period the misbranded
device was allowed to be marketed, since a seizure action is an in rem proceeding and affects
only those specific devices seized. See 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1970); Comment, U. S. v. The
Diapulse Corporation of America, 8 N. ENGLAND L. REV. 111 (1972).
67 Since the only significance in classifying AMP's products as either "drugs" or
"devices" is that if they are "drugs" they may be subject to the "new drug"
provisions of the Act, we must classify them with reference to the purpose for
which Congress enacted those provisions. That purpose was, very clearly, to
keep inadequately tested medical and related products which might cause wide-
spread danger to human life out of interstate commerce.
AMP Inc. v. Gradner, 389 F.2d 825, 829 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 825
(1968). See also United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk ..... .394
U. S. 784, 799-800 (1968):
Furthermore, the legislative history, read in light of the statute's remedial pur-
pose, directs us to read the classification "drug" broadly, and to confine the
device exception as nearly as is possible to the types of items Congress suggested
in the debates, such as electric belts, quack diagnostic scales, and therapeutic
lamps, as well as bathroom weight scales, shoulder braces, air conditioning units,
and crutches.
"United States v. Article of Drug "Mykocert," 345 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill. 1972). It
should be noted that the tampon was reclassified as impregnated with a drug.
69 United States v. 48 Dozen Packages, More or Less, of Gauze Bandage Labeled in Part
Sterilized, 94 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1938).
70 AMP Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825 (1968).
71 United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk ..... .394 U.S. 784 (1968).
Other cases concerning classification: United States v. Article . . . Consisting of 216
Cartoned Bottle. More or Less, Sudden Change, 409 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1969) (face
(Continued on next page)
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In light of the broad power possessed by the FDA and the willing-
ness of the judiciary to give full credence to the presumption of
agency expertise, it is most peculiar that the FDA has allowed the
IUD to be marketed as a device. Not only was the FDA cognizant of
the IUD before its entry onto the market, but it made a determination
to treat as a "new drug" only those IUDs possessing what it termed
"active substances" while classifying as a device the new polyethelene
model.7 2 This appears to be a rather cavalier treatment of a serious
issue in light of the insufficiency of scientific data proving the plastic
model any less lethal than either its predecessor or those IUDs con-
taining active substances.7 3 Indeed, considering the advice of its
counsel that the classification of all IUDs as drugs would be well
(Continued from preceding page)
lift preparation deemed a drug based on labeling and promotional material); United
States v. Ellis Research Laboratories, Inc., 300 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 918 (1962) (galvanometer deemed device); Orthopedic Equipment Co. v.
Butsler, 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960) (surgical nails deemed devices); United States
v. 23, More or Less, Articles, 192 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1951) (phonograph record for
insomnia deemed a device); United States v. Article Consisting of 46 Devices, "Dynatone,"
315 F. Supp. 588 (D. Minn. 1970) (facial exerciser deemed a device); United States v.
2000 Plastic Tubular Cases, More or Less, Toothbrushes, 231 F. Supp. 236 (M.D. Pa.
1964), afl'd, 352 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1966) (tooth-
brush deemed a device); United States v. Grayce Inc., 126 F. Supp. 6 (N.D. Ind. 1954)
(vaginal suppositories deemed drugs).
7221 C.F.R. § 310.502 (1974). A summation of the pertinent provisions of this regulation
by Mr. Sherwin Gardner, Acting Commissioner, appears in Fountain Hearings at 199:
Intrauterine devices used for the purpose of contraception and incorporating
heavy metals, drugs, or other active substances to increase the contraceptive
effect, to decrease adverse reactions, or to provide increased medical acceptability,
are not generally recognized as safe and effective for contraception and are new
drugs within the meaning of section 201 (p) of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act. A completed and signed "Notice of Claimed Investigational Ex-
emption for a New Drug" . . . must therefore be submitted to cover clinical
investigations to obtain evidence that such preparations are safe and effective
for this use. An approved new-drug application is required for the marketing
of such articles.
Excluded from consideration as new drugs are:
(1) Intrauterine devices fabricated solely from inactive materials (e.g.
inactive plastics or metals).
(2) Intrauterine devices with substances added to improve the physical
characteristics if such substances do not contribute to contraception through
chemical action on or within the body and are not dependent upon being
metabolized for the achievement of the contraceptive purpose.
(3) Intrauterine devices that contain a component, such as barium, added
exclusively for the purpose of visualization by X-ray.
13 The Fountain Hearings are replete with testimony decrying the sufficiency of data which
purportedly supports the thesis that second generation IUDs are safer or more efficacious
than their predecessors. An excerpt of a letter from Dennis F. Hawkins, M.D., to the
Editor of the British Medical Journal, May 10, 1969, at 381, in Fountain Hearings at
314, summarizes the problem.
Taking a second look at the numerous and comprehensive reports on IUDs, one
is struck by two components. The first of these is the almost naive and zealous
optimism of the workers in this field, who record incidences of 3% to 30% of
expulsions, 1%7 to 9% of pregnancies, up to 8% of pelvic inflammatory disease,
and 2% to 78% of menstrual disorders and then tend to conclude that this is
a safe, effective, and acceptable contraceptive method.
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within FDA authority74 and the recommendation of its advisory com-
mittee that there was a compelling need for such action, 75 it may even
be alleged that the FDA's inaction bordered on gross abuse of dis-
cretion (if in actuality this was a discretionary function).
Even though the FDA of its own volition will not reclassify the
IUD, this decision is not dispositive of the issue. The purpose of the
Act is to protect the consumer from products which may be harmful;
and, untested medical devices which are capable of inflicting injury
should fall distinctly within this realm. The IUD is certainly an article
that affects the functioning of the human body, whether it operates
as a contraceptive or an abortifacient, and as such it fits nicely into the
definition of a drug. Under such a classification the consumer would
be afforded more adequate protection.
It seems logical that standing would be accorded to organizations
such as the Coalition for the Medical Rights of Women or the National
Organization of Women (NOW) to petition the FDA for a reclassifi-
14 Memorandum from William G. Goodrich, Assistant General Counsel for FDA to James
L. Goodard, M.D., Commissioner, March 19, 1968, in Fountain Hearings at 206.
I recommend that we issue a general statement of policy, such as the following,
and then proceed on a case-by-case basis:
The recent decision of the Court of Appeals in AMP, Inc. v. Gardner points
out that the "new drug" provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act are not limited to products that are "drugs" in the conventional sense of
the word, but cover a much broader range of products. The purpose of the new
drug provisions, the Court said, requires that medical and related products
which might cause widespread danger, if inadequately tested, be classified
as "new drugs."
Accordingly, the Food and Drug Administration will regard therapeutic
articles which have such potential for danger as "new drugs", unless they are
generally recognized by qualified experts as safe and effective for their intended
uses. Any doubts as to classification of an article will be resolved in favor
of designating such article a "drug" within the meaning of the Act.
The New Drug Status Branch of the Bureau of Medicine will offer an
opinion as to whether an article will be regarded as a "new drug", when requested
to do so and when the article, its intended uses, and its labeling are adequately
described.
Subsequent to, or contemporaneously with, issuance of such a policy state-
ment, I recommend the intrauterine device manufacturers be called to a meeting
with you to discuss the steps to be taken for reasonably prompt filings of new
drug applications. The Advisory Committee on Obstetrics and Gynecology Report
on Intrauterine Devices clearly establishes that these articles meet the criteria
of the AMP case for "new drugs." The Report points out the widespread use
of the devices [pp. 12-141, possible serious adverse reactions [pp. 19-221, the
need for more stringent procedures for sterilization [p. 25) and sterile pre-
packaging with disposable inserters to reduce insertion perforations [pp. 20-23],
and, most important, the need for more research and more adequate testing of
the products [p. 25a]. The Report amply illustrates the need for regulation of
the distribution of IUD's [sic] and for control over future developments of
such products.
5 Id. See those sections in the memorandum referring to the Advisory Committee's report
and their recommendations. See also the proposed draft of a regulation to reclassify IUDs
as new drugs in Fountain Hearings at 218.
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cation of the IUD,76 for women are the only class to whom such a
ruling would be beneficial and the only class for whom such failure to
rule would be detrimental. In the event the FDA refuses to reclassify
(the FDA voiced the opinion that the task of handling so many new
drug applications would be to massive in scope),77 the women might
76 This review of a women's group petition is apparently taking place at the present time.
The Coalition for the Medical Rights of Women, in correspondence to Alexander Schmidt,
Commisioner, November 26, 1974, urged the FDA to institute effective regulation of
IUDs by repealing 21 C.F.R. § 130.50 (1974); issue a ruling that all IUDs are to be
deemed "new drugs" instead of devices; and require labeling directed to patients similar to
that required by 21 C.F.R. § 130.45 (1974) for oral contraceptives. Letter from Ms.
Erica Black Grubb, attorney for the Coalition, to the Cleveland State Law Review, February
20, 1975 (stated that the FDA was treating the correspondence as a formal petition and
the Coalition would be allowed "additional time to file a memo of points and authorities").
7 This was alluded to as the main reason that IUDs were not reclassified, even in light of
United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784 (1968), and AMP
Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825 (2d Cit. 1968),cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825 (1968).Testimony
by Peter B. Hurt, General Counsel, Food and Drug Administration, in Fountain Hearings
at 258. However, in a memorandum from Mr. Hutt to Dr. Davis, Director of the Division
of Clinical Devices, October 30, 1970, Mr. Hurt listed several other possible reasons for
the FDA's failure to reclassify:
If the IUD's are to be considered drugs, we can anticipate the following:
(a) Legal action to prevent us from making such a move since we have
always considered them as devices; for example, see 21 CFR, section 3.49 on
Pessaries.
(b) Criticism of FDA for not revising or updating the 1968 Report on
IUD's where the experts clearly classify them as devices.
(c) Need for a demonstration on our part of the severity of the problem
which would require such an extreme departure.
(d) Damaged relations with the device industry and medical profession
who have sought to cooperate in contributing to a solution which would clarify
the confusion created by AMP and Bacto-Unidisk.
(e) This would seriously hamper prospects for device legislation since this
effort could demonstrate a lack of good faith on the part of FDA and stimulate
increased resistance on the part of industry to support future device legislation.
(f) Creation of a difficult regulatory program to administer since products
would have to be withdrawn from market if it could be successfully argued
these are drugs requiring an NDA.
(g) Lastly, confusion in the nomenclature since the descriptive term intra-
uterine devices would create an unusual anomaly.
If the IUD's are to remain as devices, I believe a much more prudent
course of action could be followed which would result in less confusion. This
could encompass the following:
(a) Calling together of industry to discuss problems and seek appropriate
solutions by voluntary action - e.g., this was illustrated by our recent meetings
with Pacemaker industry.
(b) Convening of Committee on Obstetrics and Gynecology to again review
the status of IUD's.
(c) Collection of additional scientific data on hazards.
(d) If regulatory action is necessary, expansion of our regulatory authority
by promulgation of regulations under Section 502 of the Act on the basis that
certain - or all - products are so unsafe that they cannot be labeled with
adequate directions for the use even under professional supervision.
By retaining authority over IUD's as devices, we preserve some distinction
between drugs and devices, avoid unnecessary public and legal battles, and
retain, for the purposes of legislation, one of our better justifications for additional
regulatory authority over devices. If it is necessary to take action based on the
scientific data accumulated, I believe we could expect voluntary cooperation from
the industry and perhaps additional support from the Ob-Gyn Committee. If
regulations are necessary, we sould seek new ways to expand our authority under
the present Act.
(Continued on next page)
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then petition for a thorough review of all labeling accompanying
IUDs onto the market in an effort to ascertain if the many abuses
brought out at the Fountain Hearings are still extant.78 Where these
violations are prevalent, the women could then request the FDA to
utilize its statutory authority to deem such illicit IUDs as misbranded
and enjoin the manufacturer from selling the products until the re-
quisite modifications in labeling have been made.7 9 If this request is
not acted upon, the women should then turn to the courts.80
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)8 1 confers standing to
sue on any party who is aggrieved by agency action if the interest
they espouse is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
by the statute in question (i.e., they are of the class which Congress
intended to be benefited by the statute).82 The refusal by the FDA to
reclassify the IUD as a drug, or at least adequately police the industry,
may be considered as a final administrative action. The women would
then be the aggrieved parties of the agency's final decision since they
are in effect relegated to the status of guinea pigs ;83 a result directly
(Continued from preceding page)
The decision to classify IUD's as drugs should come only as a last resort
and must be the direct result of a convincing accumulation of data to the effect
that IUD's are unsafe and hazardous. If the demonstrated problem is this
serious and consequently none of the alternatives expressed above are suitable,
then this action would not prejudice our future efforts to implement the Cooper
Committee Report and probably would support in a most dramatic way the
extreme need for new device legislation.
Fountain Hearings at 253-54. The tenor of the memorandum is more fear of the manu-
facturers and their ability to forestall device legislation than concern for the consumer.
78See references in note 91 infra for examples of how physicians have corresponded with
the FDA in an attempt to call its attention to improper advertising practices.
7The FDA has statutory authority, under 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1970), to seize the mis-
branded article and petition the court, under 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1970), for an injuction.
United States v. Wilson Williams, Inc., 277 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1960). In addition to
injunction and seizure, the other methods available to the FDA to force compliance are
prosecution and, in the case of minor violations, a suitable notice or warning. Butts,
supra note 65, at 602.
10 In at least one reported case the FDA has been forced to comply with the enabling statute's
provisions through third party intervention. In American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Veneman,
349 F. Supp. 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1972), a public health association and a senior citizen's
group challenged the FDA's procrastination in administering statutes requiring drugs to be
as efficacious as their labels represented. The district court granted summary judgment for
the plaintiffs and ordered the FDA to perform its function.
81 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970).
82 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
83 Statement of John G. Madry, Jr., M.D., in Fountain Hearings at 11:
Because of the prodigious flow of prominent distribution to physicians of reports
by population planners, as well as occurrence of friendly news articles in lay
publications, American physicians in private practice appear to have unwittingly
become participants in a great experiment in population control, utilizing as
experimental subjects patients for whom the IUD was not even the prime target
for usage. Yet neither physicians nor patients have been provided sufficient
facts by researchers or manufacturers to allow for any IUD to have been inserted
on the basis of informed advice by the physician or informed consent by the
patient.
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contrary to the Act's espoused purpose. These women consumers are
the class Congress intended to be the beneficiaries of the Act. Al-
though the issue of standing is not easily resolved, because of their
unique position women plaintiffs should (as this note will assume)
have standing to bring an action seeking judical interpretation of the
statute.
84
The initial argument that complaintants could pose would be that,
in light of its legislative history, the FDA has grossly misconstrued
the statute, or if the court is inclined to consider classification a dis-
cretionary function, that the FDA has grossly abused its discretion.
The fact that an IUD comes to the physician in a sterile package85
should be sufficient for the court to warrant reclassification (and
courts have in the past held that labeling a product as sterile was
reason enough to classify the product as a drug) 86 because only then
can the FDA exercise sufficient control over the manufacturing process
to ensure that the product actually reaches the consumer in that con-
dition. A fortiori, when this fact is coupled with the dearth of scientific
knowledge relative to the operation of an IUD in the human body 87
and the magnitude and extent of the reported injuries,88 the reasons
for reclassification of the IUD as a drug for greater consumer protec-
tion become overwhelming.
In the event the court is disinclined to effect a reclassification, the
alternative remedy sought should be in the nature of mandamus to
compel the FDA to perform its statutory mandate by stringently
policing the labeling violations in the IUD industry.89 While it is true
84 For a discussion of the intricate problems involved in the issue of standing, see K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §§ 22.01-22.07 (3d ed. 1972).
85 Statement of Sherwin Gardner, Acting Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, in
Fountain Hearings at 199. However, it appears that it was not until the Food and Drug
Administration contacted the manufacturers and requested prepackaging in sterile units that
such was the case. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY OF THE
FDA, REPORT ON INTRAUTERINE CONTRACEPTIVE DEVICES, in Fountain Hearings at
464. Under the present classification, had the manufacturers refused to even consider the
request, the FDA would have been powerless.
86 Advertising a product as sterile, just as advertising a product as having healing qualities, is
sufficient criteria for classification as a drug rather than device. United States v. 48 Dozen
Packages, More or Less, etc., 94 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1938).
87 See Hilgers, supra note 4, at 499.
8 See text at notes 29-40 supra. The reported injuries discussed in this note were, of course,
all sustained by women. Only one instance to date, has been reported in which the male
was injured by the IUD. In that case the IUD "was caught in [the) husband's uncircum-
cized foreskin and pulled out." Deming, supra note 32, at 2.
89 There is no reason to doubt the FDA's ability to force the IUD manufacturer to comply
with the Act, for FDA attempts to cure misbranding violations in other industries have
been most successful. United States v. 60 28-Capsule Bottles, More or Less, etc., 325
F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1963) (the burden of proof necessary for the Government in mis-
branding cases is merely the preponderance of the evidence); Research Laboratories, Inc.
v. United States, 167 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1948) (scientific half-truths used in labeling and
promotional literature sufficient to establish misbranding); United States v. Articles of
Drug, etc., 263 F. Supp. 212 (D. Neb. 1967) (all of the statements in label need not be
false in order to prevail on a charge of misbranding); United States v. 2000 Plastic Tubular
(Continued on next page)
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that a court may not substitute its discretion for that of the FDA in
determining which individual manufacturer's labeling is illicit, where
the FDA has failed to act against any manufacturer a court may
compel it to do so.90 Here the FDA was aware of the often misleading,
and at times false, information contained in the patient brochures
which accompanied the product.9 1 It was at least put on notice by
the Fountain Hearings.9 2 Moreover, it was aware that most manu-
facturer claims as to efficacy and safety were based on the self-serving
and scientifically questionable life-table method, 93 a method concededly
(Continued from preceding page)
Cases, More or Less, etc., 231 F. Supp. 236 (M.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 344 (3d
Cit. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1966) (if any claim is misleading the device
is misbranded); United States v. An Actricle of Device, etc., 224 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Pa.
1963).
The word "misleading" in § 352 (a) is obviously not intended to narrow the
scope of misbranding but to broaden it to cover situations in which, although
a claim is not technically false, or even if literally true, the drug or device may
nevertheless be misbranded if the total effect of the labeling is to deceive or
mislead.
Id. at 268.
90 If an agency's discretion is not utilized, or if utilized and is abused, the courts will then
intercede. Safir v. Gibson, 417 F.2d 972 (2d Cit. 1969); United States v. Shaughnessy,
133 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), af'd, 233 F.2d 705 (2d Cit. 1955), aff'd, 353 U.S. 72
(1957); Chavez v. McGranery, 112 F. Supp. 264 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Bustos-Orvalle v.
Landon, 112 F. Supp. 874 (S.D. Cal. 1953), af'd, 252 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1955); Savala-
Cisneros v. Landon, 111 F. Supp. 129 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
91 For examples of correspondence between physicians and the FDA wherein the FDA was
put on notice of any alleged violations see Fountain Hearings at 13, 21-26, 31-32, 109-
12, and 286-89. Also there is testimony by Dr. Thomsen, in Kennedy Hearings, supra note
3, at 366-67:
But even the worst of these ads are innocuous compared to some of the patient
brochures prepared for potential users of IUD's by the manufacturers or by
family planning agencies. These pamphlets are often such an amalgam of
promotion, overstatement, ommissions, and even lies that the average women
(sic] who reads such a pamphlet is in a poor position to give her informed
consent for the insertion of an IUD.
While virtually ignoring the mention of serious side effects or compli-
cations of IUD's, patient brochures wander through a veritable forest of highly
questionable assurances of which the following are typical.
"IUD's do not cause abortion." ...
"But we do know it's harmless" ...
"Once an IUD has been inserted, it entails no further costs"
The IUD is "Quietly resting in the uterine cavity - 'minding it own
business.' ...
"It works only inside the uterus - without effects on your body, blood,
or brain." ...
IUD insertion is "a simple, not painful process."
"The Food and Drug Administration is kept informed about the progress
with these devices." . ..
92 Note particularly the testimony of Dr. Thomsen wherein he proposes that the FDA and
FTC "be directed to evaluate all current and future IUD advertising or promotional
material." Fountain Hearings at 65.
9 Dr. Thomsen. . . . [T)he life-table method . . . is the accepted form of
statistical anaylsis for IUD complications.
It is a study technique for a fluid population - for instance, a population
where new patients are added and other patients drop out at any one time.
It is a method of evaluating that type of a patient population statistically, and
as such, I recognize its advantages. However, it was designed by those who are
(Continued on next page)
(Vol. 24:247
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/5
19751
unacceptable to the FDA were a new drug application for the IUD to
be required.9 4 Were this writ to be granted and the FDA to begin
policing the area, the prospective user would then have at least the
minimal assurance of being shielded from any false information.
As another tack in attempting to spur the FDA into action, a
woman who has sustained injury through the use of an IUD might
consider joining the FDA as a party defendant, under the Federal
Tort Claims Act,95 in her civil suit against the physician and manu-
facturer 6 Although joinder of the government in this type of
situation may pose a question of first impression, the likelihood of
plaintiff's success should not be summarily discounted.97 The argu-
ment for the FDA's liability would be that its nonfeasance in failing
to adequately police the misleading statements of the IUD manu-
facturers in their patient brochures and package inserts was a con-
tributing factor to her injuries, for if the manufacturer had been
compelled to delete these glib assurances of safety and efficacy she
might never have chosen this method of birth control. Furthermore,
(Continued from preceding page)
unabashedly promotional for IUD's and therefore, it leaves out many complica-
tions that should have been included.
And so, when the drug company, for instance, says our statistics quoted are
legitimate because they are after the life-table method, and that is the recognized
form, they are right, only the life-table method has glaring inadequacies.
Mr. Fountain. And it is not a controlled study?
Dr. Thomsen. It is just a method where this type of patient population can
somehow be kept in line in gathering statistics.
These statistics, based on the life-table method then, are used to advertise
the new device, and often they are projected.
And I want to explain that . . . the original study that got the device on
the market might have been based on a short insertion time . . . . The average
insertion time . . . might have been 5.5 months, but the life-table method
allows the person to say the pregnancy rate based on those 5.5 months of
observation is a 1.8 per hundred women-years of usage. In other words, as
if you were looking at a hundred women who had used it for one year of time;
but in fact, that is not what happened.
. . [T]he life-table method: . . . was originally developed to draw some
sense out of IUD research and statistics, but it has now been taken and incor-
porated into advertising. It was never even designed to be used for that.
These statistics are used to advertise the new device. Then the large number
of women fitted with the commercial device actually and unknowingly become
the study population for the IUD's. Several years later reports dribble in about
the true nature of the IUD and its complications.
Fountain Hearings at 63.
For an in-depth explanation of the life-table method by a noted expert who believes
the method to be acceptable, see statement of Professor H. Bradley Wells, in Fountain
Hearings at 517. But see the "limitations and problems" section of the prepared state-
ment by Professor Wells, in Fountain Hearings at 525-26.
94 Testimony of Charles Anello, M.D., Director, Division of Statistics, Office of Scientific
Coordination, Bureau of Drugs, in Fountain Hearings at 419.
9528 U.S.C. § 1346 et seq. (1970).
96 See text beginning at note 109 infra for a discussion of the basic theories underlying
manufacturer liability.
9 See generally DAVIS, supra note 84, §§ 25.01-25.06 and cases cited therein for an elucida-
tion of the problems likely to arise and an insight into their possible solution.
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had the FDA classified the IUD as a drug, the more stringent controls
would have applied, and the manufacturer would have had to convince
the government of the IUD's suitability prior to marketing. The
classification of the IUD as a device and the FDA's failure to police
product labeling both appear, at first glance, to be discretionary func-
tions and thus exempt from Federal Tort Claims Act liability9 8 Con-
sidering the difficulties in differentiating between a drug and a device
under the Act, and further considering the fact that a conscious
decision was made at a planning level to classify the IUD as a device, a
court may be prone to determine that the FDA's actions are immunized.
However, the exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act that immunizes
discretionary functions from liability should not attach to the FDA's
nonfeasance in allowing misbranded medical devices to flourish in
the market. The FDA's affirmative duty to halt illicit trafficing of
misbranded medical devices, a duty delegated to the FDA by con-
gressional mandate, while discretionary to a point, is not discretionary
when a complete industry rather than an individual manufacturer
thrives in violation of the Act.
In Indian Towing Co. v. United States,9 the leading Supreme
Court case discussing an agency's discretionary function, the Court
ruled that once the government, through the United States Coast
Guard, had exercised its discretion in putting a navigational aid at a
certain location, and reliance was engendered thereon, the govern-
ment had a duty to make certain that the aid was kept in good working
order. The government, said the Court, was not under a duty to put the
navigational aid at that particular location, for this was a decision to
be made within the discretion of the Coast Guard. But once the govern-
ment's discretion was exercised, the implementation of that discre-
tionary decision must be adequately and non-negligently performed.
The IUD situation is analogous. The preliminary decision by the FDA
to abide by the manufacturer's initial determination that the IUD was
a device rather than a drug was, again, made at a planning level and
enjoyed discretionary immunity. Following this initial decision, the
duty of non-negligently implementing that decision directly parallels
the duty found in Indian Towing of maintaining navigational aids
established by the Coast Guard. Arguably the act of policing the
IUD industry is not planning level activity but rather operational
activity - a level of activity the Indian Towing Court held did not
enjoy exemption under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
"The discretionary exception to governmental liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act
is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). For an excellent law review article discussing
the possibility of governmental tort liability when the FDA approves a new drug appli-
cation for an unsafe drug see Note, The Drug Amendments of 1962: How Much Regula-
tion?, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 135 et seq. (1963).
"350 U.S. 61 (1955).
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The FDA negligently performed its policing function. Meager
attempts at regulating the industry - for example, taking off the
market an IUD composed of active materials for misbranding viola-
tions when, conveniently, and of course unknown to the general public,
the manufactured supply had all been disposed of 1OO may have
engendered reliance by both physicians and the general public that
the FDA was in fact monitoring the manufacturers' activities ef-
fectively. The reasonablness of this conclusion is further supported
by the practical consideration that if the FDA took one product off
the market for misbranding, the logical interpretation of that act
by the public would be that the others remaining must be in compliance
with FDA standards. For such detrimental reliance the plaintiffs
must be compensated.
In the event that the FDA qualifies this action against the man-
ufacturers of active substance IUDs and states that it has taken no
action against manufacturers of inert IUDs thereby occasioning no
reliance, the counter argument is that the general public makes no
such distinction. Furthermore, the Court in Indian Towing, in dis-
cussing the planning and operational level functions relative to the
decision of where to place navigational aids, neither said nor even
intimated that no aid need be put anywhere. If such were the holding,
then the enabling statute would be rendered nugatory.
Since, the Court said, the Coast Guard had a responsibility to
decide, in their discretion, where to erect navigational aids to protect
mariners, exercise of that discretion was essential. Again, the IUD
situation is analogous. The FDA has a responsibility to protect con-
sumers through efficient enforcement of the statutory labeling pro-
visions. The American consumer has grown to depend on govern-
mental agencies for protection in areas where he is ill-equipped to
fend for himself, and protection is sorely needed when drugs and
prescription devices are involved. The agency decision of whether to
100 Mr. Fountain: . . . [I]t seem curious that FDA failed to take any action
in 1971 [against the manufacturer of the Majzlin Spring], but acted with
apparent vigor 2 or 3 weeks ago during the midst of this subcommittee's
investigation.
But the thing that bothers me is that this action didn't come until the
Majzlin device had run its course or lived its life cycle. From the evidence in the
record of this hearing so far, it would appear the Majzlin Spring's commercial
venture began in 1968 with optmistic reports of the IUD's safety and effective-
ness. Sales of the IUD reached a peak and then apparently, because of safety
questions which arose, the device entered a period of decline, and, finally,
the company, apparently because of mounting suits and difficulties, decided to
stop producing the units and phased out the stock they had already produced.
It was at this point that the FDA decided to act, at the time the venture
was practically at its end point. What FDA appears to have done in this
particular instance was to put the finishing touches on its demise by its seizure
and recall. But at that point the damage had already been done and many women,
it seems to me, had been needlessly injured.
Fountain Hearings at 292-93.
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proceed against individual manufacturers, just as the decision of
whether to place a navagational aid at a particular location, is
discretionary. But allowing a complete industry to thrive unregulated
when the government has notice of gross violations of the statutory
provisions enacted to protect against such illegal growth should be
deemed abuse of discretion through nonfeasance. No planning level
discretion has this much breadth. The mandate of Congress is clear,
and the duty must be considered absolute. The function of the FDA
is to act as an equalizer between the consumer and the manufacturer
whose expertise far surpasses the meager knowledge of the average
consumer. If discretion comes into play at all, it is in determining
whether to proceed against an individual manufacturer for a specific
violation or in selecting the appropriate sanction to impose on the
offender. There can be no discretion to refrain from action when an
entire industry is involved. 10 1 While it is true that the task of ferret-
ing out violations may at times be staggering, nonetheless, when
considering the many violations committed by the IUD industry as
a whole that were specifically elucidated during the Fountain Hear-
ings, the subsequent failure to act in this instance cannot be
condoned by the courts.
The injured plaintiffs might also consider joining the FTC as
another possible defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act, be-
cause, in the area of medical devices, it exercises sole jurisdiction over
101 The exception to government liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act that dis-
cretionary functions are immune from criticism "accomplishes the legitimate congressional
goal of permitting the framers of policy to reach their decisions free from having to
consider governmental liability." Hink & Schutter, Some Thoughts on the American Law
of Governmental Tort Liability, 20 RUTGERs L. REV. 710, 724 (1966). However, for
cases holding, in situations akin to the FDA's nonfeasance, that governmental bodies
may be liable for failure to perform a function, see United States v. Gavagan, 280
F.2d 319, 327 (5th Cir. 1960) :
We may assume that non-performance by a government employee of an intra-
governmental duty does not give rise to a civil right in the citizen adversely
affected. But the fact remains that, on the analogy of private maritime salvage,
these government employees had no right, either absolute or qualified, to abandon
or withdraw. On the contrary they were bound to continue ......
Kunkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173, 178, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485, 490-91
(1953):
the surrender of the sovereign immunity from liability with respect to a
governmental function, is not limited to any acts of misfeasance or nonfeasance
- commision or omission. The surrender is broad, general and unqualified. The
only test of liability to be invoked now is . . . , namely: Whether upon all the
facts in the case an individual or private corporation would be liable for the
breach if the governmental duty were imposed upon him or it.
See also United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963); Beverly v. Morris, 470 F.2d 1356
(5th Cir. 1972); Veach v. City of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 195, 427 P.2d 335 (1967);
Latimer v. City of Clovis, 83 N.M. 610, 495 P.2d 788 (1972); Schuster v. City of New
York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958); McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y.
99, 71 N.E.2d 419 (1947).
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all advertising in magazines and medical periodicals. 10 2 The argu-
ment for liability would be that although the questionable advertising
practices of IUD manufacturers were brought to the attention of the
FTC through numerous private complaints by physicians, 10 3 as well
as by the Fountain Hearings, 10 4 it failed to take any action to terminate
such tactics, thereby facilitating the dissemination of misinformation
from physician to patient. In this context the physician can be treated
as the agent of the patient when receiving information from the IUD
manufacturer,'0 5 and therefore the FTC's nonfeasance in allowing
the dissemination of false and misleading information to reach the
physician is contributory to the plaintiff's injury.
While the FTC enjoys the same discretionary latitude as the FDA
to ignore minor infractions and to selectively prosecute wayward
manufacturers, it likewise does not possess the authority to casually
ignore an entire industry. The reason proffered at the Fountain
Hearings for its nonfeasance in relation to the IUD industry in toto
was that the FTC lacked the expertise necessary to adequately monitor
advertisements relating to any facet of the medical device industry.
10 6
If this type of inaction had existed for only a short period of time
10221 U.S.C. §45 (1970); Statement by Gerald J. Thain, Assistant Director for National
Advertising, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Fountain Hear-
ings at 388:
The memorandum of understanding between the Federal Trade Commission and
the Food and Drug Administration, most recently updated on September 9,
1971, explicitly recognizes . . . a . . . statutory differentiation ' in allocating
responsibility for advertising. The agreement states in part:
(a) With the exception of prescription drugs, the Federal Trade Com-
mission has primary responsibility with respect to the regulation of the truth
or falsity of all advertising (other than labeling) of foods, drugs, devices, and
cosmetics. In the absence of express agreement between the two agencies to the
contrary the Commission will exercise primary jurisdiction over all matters re-
gulating the truth or falsity of advertising of foods, drugs (with the exception
of prescription drugs), devices, and cosmetics.
(b) The Food and Drug Administration has primary responsibility for
preventing misbranding of foods, drugs, devices, and cosmetics shipped in inter-
state commerce. The Food and Drug Administration has primary responsibility
with respect to the regulation of the truth or falsity of prescription drug
advertising.
103Examples of correspondence between physicians and the Federal Trade Commission
wherein the FTC was put on notice of alleged violations can be found in Fountain
Hearings at 7-8, 112-15.
10The FTC was represented at the Fountain Hearings by Mr. Gerald J. Thain, Assistant
Director for National Advertising, Bureau of Consumer Protection.
15 See notes 148-5 3 and accompanying text intra.
106Testimony of Gerald J. Thain, Assistant Director for National Advertising, Bureau of
Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Fountain Hearings at 392:
FTC does have the responsibility under the law for regulation of the advertising
of these devices. We have not attempted, to be prefectly honest, to monitor
the advertising for these devices under our advertising monitoring program
because the advertising which appears in medical journals is of a nature which
requires more technical input than we have at out immediate disposal.
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perhaps it might be excusable. Likewise, if action were being taken
within this period of time to either find another administrative agency
whose expertise was capable of handling the problem or at least
requesting such assistance from Congress, then the FTC's actions
might again be excusable. However, the FTC admitted that this un-
conscionable deficiency has existed for at least ten years, with no
plan or suggestions to correct it in the offing. 107 It is unthinkable that
Congress could have intended that the entire medical device industry
go unregulated at the whim of the FTC. This situation is further
intensified by the fact that these instruments are intimately connected
with vital-bodily organs and thus have an exceptional potential to
harm.108
If these two agencies are allowed to escape liability for their
gross neglect of an entire industry on the basis that their decision not
to act was made at the planning level and was therefore immune
from judicial review, the purpose for their very existence is evis-
cerated. Surely discretion cannot be accorded such great weight that
it can be used as a legal excuse for nonfeasance in a situation where
regulatory action is mandatory. The American consumer has grown
to rely on these agencies to shield him from unscrupulous entre-
peneurs - indeed he has nowhere else to turn. Perhaps the imposition
of liability for this intolerable ineptitude will cause these regulators
to re-evaluate their posture toward the IUD industry and will hope-
fully impel them into action. As one physician said in correspondence
imploring the FTC to utilize its regulatory power to police the ad-
vertising of the IUD industry:
In closing - a final appeal for action, as it were - name
a commonly used prescription medication which has a yearly
complication rate expectancy for the patient of about 20-25
per cent including pain, hemorrhage, pregnancy, disasters
°'ZId. at 393-94:
Mr. Fountain. Are you saying that the FTC, which has the responsibility for
monitoring advertising and promotional methods, takes the position that it is not
essential because you say you don't have the expertise and that it ought to be
done as a cooperative venture between FDA and FTC?
Mr. Thain. I think what I am trying to say is that FTC takes the position
it is very essential that monitoring and regulation of these devices occur but that
it lacks the resources to effectively carry out the monitoring and regulation under
its current setup at the Federal Trade Commission.
Mr. Fountain. How long have you known that you lacked that expertise?
Mr. Thain. I suppose that as long as I have been at the Federal Trade Com-
misson, we have not had the resources to develop this kind of monitoring
and review and followthrough.
Mr. Fountain. You said you have been there 10 years?
Mr. Thain. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Fountain. Is FTC considering the initiation of monitoring of advertise-
ments for prescription medical devices?
Mr. Thain. At this point in time; no sir, they are not.
103 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §34[A][1), at 9A-4 (1973).
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leading to surgery and sometimes death, and which in no
way is controlled by the government in respect to testing,
advertising, and patient disclosure. Name one such pill and
I will go find for you a gorgeous camel which smells like a
rose and can read a slide rule.10 9
The Manufacturer
Before analyzing the potential liability of IUD manufacturers,
it would be well to summarize some of the more bothersome practices
followed by manufacturers as they vigorously propounded the IUD
as the safest and most efficacious method of birth control. It should
be noted at the onset that, insofar as possible, every effort will be
made to avoid isolating the practices of any one manufacturer (al-
though the tactics of some have been more distressing than those
of others). Moreover, it is also necessary to state that, in order to
facilitate the analysis, for the purposes of this note the information
contained in the Fountain Hearings will be assumed to be true because
there are, as of yet, no reported decisions of cases involving injuries
caused by IUDs 1 0 and only one manufacturer testified at the
hearings."
Prior to the late 1960's the majority of IUDs manufactured in this
country were sold abroad, primarily in so-called underdeveloped na-
tions of the world.11 2 This effort was greatly facilitated by the World
Population Council in the belief that the IUD was the most econom-
ically feasible of the many birth control methods available;113 and,
especially attractive to these countries, with their masses of econom-
ically dependent inhabitants, was the fact that the one-time insertion
109 Letter from Russel J. Thomsen, M.D. to Mr. Russell Hatchl, Federal Trade Commission,
Feb. 26, 1973, in Fountain Hearings at 115.
110The only decision to date is unreported: Bookout v. A.H. Robins, Inc., No. C-28040
(Dist. Ct. of Sedgewick Cry., Kan. 1975). Counsel of record, Mr. Bradley Post, has
provided the following information: a jury verdict in the amount of $85,000 was returned
against the defendant manufacturer (comprised of $10,000 compensatory and $75,000
punitive) and the defendant physician was not held liable; the allegations in the com-
plaint yielding the compensatory damages were premised on negligent design, causing
migration and perforation, and breach of implied warranties; the allegations in the
complaint yielding punitive damages were premised on fraud, wilful misrepresentation
and gross and wanton negligence. The action complained of wrongful birth and perfor-
ation, however for public policy reasons the court would not allow the issue of wrongful
birth to go to the jury. Thus the damages were for migration and perforation. Telephone
interview with Bradley Post, Feb. 19, 1975.
11 Although unquestionably all of the major IUD manufacturers were aware of the Fountain
Hearings, the only manufacturer to be commended for its voluntary attendance and
testimony was the A. H. Robins Company, the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield.
112Hilgers, supra note 4, at 499, 500-01; Letter from Raymond B. Wait, M.D. to John G.
Madry, M.D., Feb. 18, 1970. Fountain Hearings at 19.
'3An Evaluation of Intrauterine Contraceptive Devices by the Committee on Human
Reproduction, American Medical Association, and an Evaluation of Oral Contraceptives
by the Council on Drugs, American Medical Association, Fountain Hearings at 40, 43-44;
Hilgers, supra note 4, at 499, 500-01.
IUDs
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
cost was minimal compared to the recurring costs of other methods.' 14
Also, it appears to be a reasonable conjecture that American man-
ufacturers were comfortable in their belief that legal liability for
IUD incurred injuries would be avoided since the status of product
liability law in those countries, as opposed to that of the United States,
had probably not advanced far enough to encompass the wrongs
caused by IUDs.1 5 Given this atmosphere, the impetus for extensive
pre-market testing, and the fear of liability for such failure to pre-
test, was almost nonexistent. At least ostensibly, the manufacturer
was in a position to market his product with relative impunity and
at the same time enjoy rather large economic profits.
When the pill panic swept through this country at the turn of the
past decade, IUD manufacturers were quick to capitalize on this
incipient market.11 6 The potential for an immediate profit could well
have quelched any desire to engage in necessary pre-market testing,
and thus the product was promoted to physicians on the basis of a
few highly questionable studies of extremely short duration.1 17
114 Id.
s Since research of the product liability laws of the these nations is beyond the scope of
this note, this statement is dearly conjecture. However, considering the fact that, in many
instances, the manufacturers sold the IUDs to the United States who in turn, through the
Agency for International Development supplied the IUDs by the millions to such im-
poverished nations as India (presumably without any charge to the receiving nation)
the conjecture seems reasonable. Letter from Raymond B. Wait, M.D. to John G. Madry,
M.D., Feb. 18, 1970. Fountain Hearings at 19. Since suit by the injured consumer
would presumably have to entail joining the U.S. government as a party defendant, the
likelihood of such suit appears minimal. Also, there exists the problem of discovering
the injury and tagging it as IUD related, as so pointed out by Dr. Tietze in Fountain
Hearings at 375.
116 Statement of Russel J. Thomsen, M.D., Fountain Hearings at 143.
117 One advertisement, in Fountain Hearings at 87, also contained these clinical tests as
support for the IUD's safety and efficacy:
The following clinical data from four published studies including net cumulative
event rates (life table method) substantiate the low pregnancy and expulsion
rates of the Dalkon Shield. In 3,174 insertions and after 17,222 woman-months
of us (see chart below) the pregnancy rate ranged from A% to 1.9% and
the expulsion rate from .2% to 2.3%. Note that there were 1,276 nulliparous
[sic) patients in the four studies.
Davis1  Earl 2  Ostergard 3  Gabrielson 4
Pregnancy rate 1.1% 0.5% 1.1% 1.9%
Expulsion rate 2.3% 0.2% 1.0% 1.2%
Medical removals 2.0% 2.7% 9.7% 14.9%
Personal removals* 0.6% 1.9% Not given 1.8%
Continuation rate 94.0% 94.7% 88.2% * 80.2%
Insertions 640 536 1,242 756
nulliparas 51 142 327 756
multiparas 589 394 915 None
Woman-months of use 3,549 4,633 5,415 3,625
nulliparas - - 1,222 3,625
multiparas - - 4,193 None
Time period 12 mos. 15 mos. 9 mos. 9 mos.
(Continued on next page)
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Furthermore, the product was billed as a panacea in the area of birth
control - equally as effective as the pill, but with none of the dan-
gerous side effects. 118 From the testimony given at the Fountain
Hearings, this now appears to be far from the truth.
Patient brochures, the method primarily used to reach women
directly, were not only misleading but in many instances actually
contained false information.11 9 A close reading of this promotional
material reveals that every conceivable effort was made to capitalize
on the many fears most women had about the pill. Many of the state-
ments made in advertisements aimed at physicians and in patient
brochures were directly contrary to information that should have
been in the manufacturers' files.12 0 Moreover, any unfavorable ex-
periences that were contained in unpublished studies by private
practitioners, even though brought to the manufacturers' attention,
were ignored. 121 This is particularly disturbing since in most instances
the majority of physicians would never have this information brought
to their attention except through revelations by the manufacturer.
Furthermore, there was no effort to up-date the information contained
in their warnings until the number of reported adverse reactions
attained sizeable proportions 2 2 Similarly, with respect to the up-
(Continued from preceeding page)
1. Davis, Hugh J. Am. J. Ob. Gyn. 106 (3) 455-56 (February 1) 1970.
2. Earl, Thad J. Am. Fam. Phy. 4 (3) 93 (September) 1971.
3. Ostergard, Donald R. Contraception 4 (5) 313 (November) 1971.
4. Gabrielson, Mary 0. Advances in Planned Parenthood, Vol. 7, Proceedings
of the 9th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Planned Parent-
hood Physicians, Kansas City, Missouri, April 5-6, 1971.
* Includes removals for desired pregnancy and other personal reasons.
* * Would be slightly lower if personal removal rates were included in event
rates.
Fountain Hearings at 87.
For a discussion regarding the inadequate length of these cited studies and why they
were questionable see note 183 infra.
118 The advertisements in medical journals and the patient brochures should be ample evidence
of the IUD manufacturer's billing the IUD as safer than the pill. See Fountain Hearings
at 80-108, particularly 80, 86, 90-91, 104.
1'See note 91 supra for specific examples of misstatements related by Dr. Thomsen at the
Kennedy Hearings.
110 See textual discussion in note 123 intra.
121 See text following note 191 infra.
122 Appearing in the Fountain Hearings at 399-402, is an IUD advertisement in which the
manufacturer lists warnings, precautions and adverse effects. The date of the advertise-
ment is November 20, 1972, and the listed warnings and adverse effects are almost identical
to the ones listed in the package insert for the same manufacturer's IUD - up to
October 1973:
Warnings:
1. As with all IUD's, insertion before 8-12 weeks post-partum (or post abortion)
may be attended by a higher risk of uterine perforation.
(Continued on next page)
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(Continued from preceeding page)
2. [Our IUD] exhibits a relatively low level of radiopacity because of its thin
construction, and in some patients, particularly the obese, soft-tissue technique
may be needed to achieve visualization.
3. Spontaneous complete or partial expusion of this device may occur. Reports
indicate that [our IUD) not in its high fundal position may not provide antici-
pated contraceptive effect.
Adverse Effects: Inter-menstrual spotting and prolongation and increase in the
menstrual flow, particularly during the first few cydes following insertion.
Lower abdominal cramping, usually transient. Post-insertion syncope, particularly
in nulliparas. Infection.
However, in October 1973, three months after the damaging testimony in the Fountain
Hearings which alleged the numerous adverse reactions, the following comprised the
package insert's warnings and adverse effects:
Warnings:
1. As with all IUD's, uterine perforation (partial or complete) is a recognized
risk. Great care should be exercised in examining and sounding the uterus, and
in inserting the device. Insertion before 8-12 weeks post-partum (or post-
abortion) may be attended by a higher risk of uterine perforation. Adhesions
have been reported between the perforated [IUD], adjacent omentum, abdominal
and/or pelvic viscera. Perforated devices should be removed.
2. Severe sepsis, with fatal outcome, most often associated with spontaneous
abortion following pregnancy with [our IUD] in situ has been reported. In
view of this, serious consideration should be given to removing the device
when the diagnosis of pregnancy is made with [our IUD] in situ.
3. [Our IUD] exhibits a relatively low level of radiopacity because of its thin
construction, and in some patients, particularly the obese, soft-tissue technique
may be needed to achieve visualization.
4. Spontaneous complete or partial expulsion of this device may occur. Ex-
pulsion may be more frequent among younger women; usually occurs during
menses; and particularly occurs during the first few months after insertion.
[An IUD] not in its high fundal position may not provide anticipated con-
traceptive effect.
5. The ratio of ectopic-uterine pregnancies is considerably higher in women who
become pregnant with an IUD in situ than in women who become pregnant
without an IUD. There is no evidence that ectopic pregnancies are caused
by IUD's.
6. String breakage or "pull through" of the string at its tie point on [our IUD)
has been reported in connection with difficult removals, usually associated with
embedment or partial perforation.
7. The proportion of pregnancies which terminate in spontaneous abortion
is considerably higher in the presence of IUD's.
Adverse Effects: Major adverse effects include excessive bleeding, pelvic in-
flammatory disease, and embedment. Less esrious effects include irregular bleed-
ing, uterine cramping, pelvic pain, and backache. Increased or irregular bleed-
ing may occur, particularly during the first few cycles following insertion.
Uterine cramping is usually transient in multiparous women but may be moderate
to severe and last for several days in nulliparas. Postinsertion syncope may occur,
particularly in nulliparas. Septic abortion has been reported. Latent infections
may be aggravated by an IUD.
Since those testifying stated throughout the Hearings that they had already informed
the manufacturer of these problems well in advance of the Hearings, this change in the
updating of warnings can not be attributed to the fact that the testimony in the Fountain
Hearings first brought these problems to the manufacturer's attention. This particular man-
ufacturer should not be considered as the exception, for numerous manufacturers, as
shown by testimony throughout the Fountain Hearings, engaged in the same deceptive
practices.
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grading of manufacturing practices, it was not until the IUD's pro-
pensity to induce vaginal infection became widely apparent that
sterility techniques were introduced. 123
These questionable practices then, while not meant to be an ex-
tensive compilation of the wrongs elucidated in the Fountain Hear-
ings, will form the primary basis of discussion in the remaining
portions of this note.
General Legal Principles
When producing an IUD for general consumption, the manufac-
turer should be required to comply with certain stringent standards
of conduct. When considering the complex nature of the IUD, the
average layman cannot be expected to evaluate the merits of the
product on the basis of his own general knowledge. Therefore, as in
the case of drug and chemical product manufacturers, the law should
demand that the IUD manufacturer exhibit the skill of an expert in
the design and preparation of his product, for only an expert can
produce an IUD that is safe and effective. 24 To ensure that a product
is reasonably safe for its intended purpose, the manufacturer must
conduct adequate tests prior to marketing to discover any potential
hazards. 125 These hazards must then be disclosed to the intended con-
123 In the 1968 Report of the Task Force on Inflammatory Reactions and Warnings, which
is Appendix 3 of the Report on Intrauterine Contraceptive Devices by the Advisory Com-
mittee on Obstetrics and Gynecology of the Food and Drug Administration, the following
statement appears:
[T]hrough the Food and Drug Administration, all of the U. S. manufacturers
and distributors of the intrauterine devices were contacted. Information on con-
trol of sterility in the manufacture of IUD's instructions to the physicians about
instertions, and plans for prepackaging in sterile units was requested.
Thus far the replies have been incomplete. When sterile packaging is
practiced, the bactreiologic controls and checks seem adequate; however, no
word has been received about plans for sterile prepackaging of the most com-
monly used device and inserter although some studies are underway.
Fountain Hearings at 464.
If the FDA had controls over the device industry similar to those exercisable over
the drug industry, the manufacturer's procrastination would not be tolerated. The man-
ufacturer should have had the same evidence of the need for sterile prepackaging as
that found by the Task Force, and this evidence should have existed prior to marketing.
Common sense indicates that inserting a foreign, unsterile object into the female's uterus
would have a tendency to induce infection. The Task Force, through the FDA, should not
have to "request" the manufacturers to take such self-evident steps - the manufacturer
should have realized the probable inherent dangers in unsterilized IUDs and acted prior
to the injuries.
124See Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957); Holland v. St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1961); Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416
S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967); Henderson v. National Drug Co., 343 Pa. 601, 23 A.2d
743 (1942).
125See Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973); Parke-Davis & Co.
v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969); O'Hare v. Merck & Co., Inc., 381
F.2d 286 (8th Cit. 1967); Gober v. Revlon, Inc., 317 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1963); Carter
Carburetor Corp. v. Riley, 186 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1951); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., Inc.,
259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932). See also Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 91 (1966).
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sumer so that her awareness of the dangers attendant to the product's
use is sufficient to enable her to make an informed choice between com-
peting models, or for the matter, competing methods of birth con-
trol.126 The information elicited at the Fountain Hearings indicates
that the manufacturers in the IUD industry have deviated from these
standards.
When an attempt is made to determine whether the IUD should
be treated as a drug or a device, it becomes at once apparent that
it must be considered something of a hybrid. 127 Since the IUD is
officially classified by the FDA as a medical device, it is not subject
to the same pre-marketing clearance requirements as an ethical drug
and, hence, it receives no governmental imprimatur1 28 However, be-
cause the nature of an IUD is so similar to that of a drug (i.e., it is
designed to interfere with a natural bodily function and its capacity
to harm is equally awesome, as evidenced by the many serious injuries
experienced by the users of first generation IUDs) 129 it seems logical
to conclude that a diligent IUD manufacturer should have performed
substantially the same degree of testing as that required of an ethical
drug manufacturer prior to releasing his product for general distri-
bution. Yet this was not the case. In fact, so exiguous is the amount
of research data compiled by the IUD industry that one expert has
gone so far as to term their general efforts "pathetic."' 130 While there
are a few "glowing" reports in the medical literature,131 these are
basically generic studies and should not suffice to relieve an indivdual
manufacturer from the responsibility to test his own product prior to
marketing. A product manufacturer may not rely on the work of a
third party unless he commissioned the study; the duty to test his
product is peculiar to him. 32
12 The duty to warn may be said to arise whenever the situation is such that a reasonable man
would want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether to expose himself to it.
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); McEwen v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522 (1974).
127 If IUDs were classified as "hybrids" rather than drugs or devices, they would join the
ranks of in vitro diagnostic products which are so classified. For a full explanation of
this unusual categorization, which in reality is the classification of items that appear
plainly to be devices but are treated as drugs to more adequately protect consumers, see
Ringuette, The Future of Diagnostic Kits and Reagents, 29 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 246
(1974).
-'
2 See text at note 45 and following supra.
In See note 10 supra. Also, now banned under 21 C.F.R. § 3.49 (1974) are intracervical and
intrauterine stem and wing type pessaries. These pessaries, in use at the time of first
generation IUDs, were utilized not only for contraception but, as the first generation
IUDs, for uterine displacement as well.
130 Statement of Russel J. Thomsen, M.D., Fountain Hearings at 61.
131 See notes 11 and 12 supra.
112 A manufacturer may not utilize as an affirmative defense the fact that the product was
negligently tested by a third party, RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 396 (1965).
See also Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 91 (1966).
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Since the IUD displays many of the same characteristics as a drug,
the standards that are imposed on the drug manufacturers with re-
spect to warnings should be applicable to the IUD industry. In the
case of drug products, a manufacturer's warnings must be calculated
to adequately apprise the intended consumer of the reasonably fore-
seeable dangers flowing from the use of the product,133 even though
the adverse reactions are expected to be experienced by only a small
percentage of users.134 The warning must incorporate all ill-effects
gleaned from the pre-marketing tests conducted by the manufacturer
as well as those reported to the manufacturer by physicians who have
been prescribing the product. 135 The manufacturer is also deemed to
have constructive knowledge of all discussions relative to his product
contained in the medical literature;136 and when these discussions
are adverse, the continuing nature of the duty should dictate that the
warning be up-dated.13 7 Furthermore, the duty exists even though
the physician is likely to be aware of the risks involved from sources
other than the manufacturer, for as one court stated, "sometimes it
is well to have our attention called to those things which we know
best."1 38 The rationale for insisting that even the most obvious adverse
effects be continually brought to the physician's attention is that only
in this manner can it be assured that at the precise moment of
prescription the chance for inadvertent error is held to a minimum.
133 See Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969); Sterling Drug, Inc.
v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cit. 1969); De Vito v. United Air Lines, Inc., 98 F. Supp.
88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951); Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 15 Cal. App. 3d 75,
92 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1971); Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., Inc., 271 Mass. 230, 171
N.E. 639 (1930); Halloran v. Parke-Davis & Co., 245 App. Div. 727, 280 N.Y.S. 58
(1935); Marcus v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 82 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
McEwen v. Ortho Pharmeceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522 (1974).
14The rule that the manufacturer need not give a warning where anticipated adverse
reactions will only affect a small percentage of users has been replaced by the theory
that the number of persons to be affected is only one of the factors to be considered in
assessing the adequacy of the warning. Where the potential harm is severe, the manu-
facturer will be required to warn all prospective users. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt,
411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cit. 1969); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th
Cit. 1968); Sterling Drugs, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966); Gober v.
Revlon, Inc., 317 F.2d 47 (4th Cit. 1963); Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53
(2d Cit. 1957); Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964); McEwen
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522 (1974); Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories,
514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974).
134 See Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cit. 1969); De Vito v. United
Airlines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
1 6See Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cit. 1970); Kershaw v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 415 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1969); O'Hare v. Merck & Co., Inc., 381 F.2d 286
(8th Cit. 1967); Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967); McEwen v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522 (1974).
37 Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970). See generally Basko
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cit. 1969); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,
399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 286 (8th Cit. 1967);
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cit. 1966); Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
416 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967).
' Abbott Laboratories v. Lapp, 78 F.2d 170, 176 (7th Cit. 1935).
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The warning need not necessarily be given by the best available
means, however, the method selected must be reasonably calculated
to "bring the warning home." 139 Of course, when the possible adverse
reactions could be severe, the manufacturer may be required to use
every available means to ensure that the prescribing physician is
conclusively apprised of the danger. 140 For prescription articles in
general, such as the IUD, the channels utilized by the manufacturer
to transmit information to the physician include detailmen (salesmen
who visit the physicians at their offices),141 advertisements in the
various medical journals, 42 package inserts,14 "dear doctor" letters, 14
19See Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 276 A.2d 36 (1971) (the duty is to give a reasonable
warning, not the best one possible); Gielski v. State, 3 Misc. 2d 578, 155 N.Y.S.2d 863
(Ct. Cl. 1956) (where the duty exists, the necessary corollary is that the warning must
be given with care).
140Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969). The circumstances will
dictate whether the warning was reasonable. Hence, even though the manufacturer has
mailed "Dear Doctor" letters, he may still be required to convey the warning via detailmen
where the potential harm is severe, because manufacturers know that physicians don't
always read the medical literature with which they are inundated. A warning may be
unreasonable if it is unduly delayed, reluctantlyy given, or lacking in a sense of urgency.
Judge Becker in Yarrow stated:
Under the circumstances of this case, when the dangers of the prolonged use
of this drug . ..became reasonably apparent, it was not unreasonable to find
that the appellant should have employed all its usual means of communication,
including detailmen, to warn the prescribing physicians of these dangers.
Id. at 992 (emphasis added).
141 The reliance by physicians on the accuracy of the detailman's reports cannot be over-
emphasized. The detailman is the physician's real link with the manufacturer, for it is
the detilman who supplies the physician not only with information concerning new
products, but also updates information on the products already on the market. At least
one court has specifically held that the failure of a manufacturer to instruct detailmen
to repeat warnings of newly found side effects of a drug ,even though contained in the
manufacturers literature, breached the manufacturer's duty to give a reasonable warning
under the circumstances. Sterling Drug, Inc v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969).
142Examples of advertisements from medical journals are found in Fountain Hearings at
82-108.
143 The information contained in the package insert generally concerns the following: indication
(prevention of pregnancy); contraindications, see note 30 supra; warnings (i-e. spontaneous
complete or partial expulsion may occur); precautions (i.e. aseptic technique should be
used during insertion); insertion prodedure; removal procedure; and adverse effects.
144 The "dear doctor" letter is a letter sent directly to the physician by the manufacturer
warning of newly discovered adverse effects of the product. A summation of the scope
of information discussed in one IUD manufacturer's "dear doctor" letter is found in
New News, June 28, 1974, at 2, a publication of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare:
More than 120,000 physicians recently received a letter from the [manufacturer]
with details of the company's own findings of possible complications if a
patient becomes pregnant while wearing [the IUD). The letter recommended
removal of the [IUD] if pregnancy occurred in spite of the device, and consider-
ation of therapeutic abortion if removal could not readily be accomplished.
To date, [the manufacturer) has data on seven deaths and approximately 100
cases of infection associated with spontaneous abortion (miscarriage) in patients
using the [IUD]. Most of these cases have occurred in the mid-trimester (4th,
5th, and 6th months) of pregnancy.
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the Physician's Desk Reference, 145 and the Medical Pharmacopeia. 14
However, the mere fact that the manufacturer has conveyed his
warning to the physician by all of the above channels may not be
sufficient to absolve him of liability in the event of serious injury.
Should an injury occur, the court will carefully scrutinize the man-
ufacturer's advertising material to ascertion whether it was designed
to induce the physician to prescribe the product despite the possible
serious consequences. Hence, the manufacturer must be chary with
his promotional material lest it be considered to unfairly predominate,
and thereby negate, any warning previously given.
1 47
When considering the sufficiency of a prescription article's warn-
ing, it is important to note that, since the warning is directed
to the physician rather than the patient, the physician is considered
the patient's agent when receiving the warning from the manufac-
turer. 48 He is a learned intermediary who deciphers the technical
jargon in the manufacturer's warning and translates it into terms
14sThe Physician's Desk Reference (PDR) is a compilation of drugs on the market and
statements relative thereto by the manufacturer, and therefore is only applicable to those
IUD's classified as drugs under 21 C.F.R. § 310.502 (1974). See note 72 supra, quoting
portions of the text of the regulation.
146 A medical pharmacopeia is defined as follows:
A work containing monographs of therapeutic agents, standards for their
strength and purity, and directions for making preparations. The various national
pharmacopeias are referred to by abbreviations .... U.S.P., the Pharamacopeia of
the United States of America (United States Pharmacopeia) . . . . The first edition
of the U.S.P. was compiled in 1820; it has since been revised every ten years,
and recently every five years, by the United States Pharmacopeia Convention,
composed of physicians, scientists, and pharmacists. The work was made a legal
standard by the terms of the National Food and Drugs Act ....
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 952 (3d Lawyers ed. 1972).
Since the pharmacopeia is not concerned with devices, it is only applicable to those
IUDs classified as drugs under 21 C.F.R. § 310.502 (1974). See note 72 supra, quoting
portions of the regulation.
147 See Stevens v. Parke-Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973);
Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971); Love v. Wolf, 226
Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964); Ducote v. Chevron Chem. Co., 227 So. 2d
601 (La. App. 1969); Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967);
Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 283 A.2d 206 (1971).
140 See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Hoffman v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 435 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973); Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417
(2d Cir. 1969); Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969);
Stottlemire v. Cawood, 213 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1963); Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer &
Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 70 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969); Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d
378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d
689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., CCH PROD. LIAB. REP.
f 7294 (N.M. App. 1974); Wechsler v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 198 Misc. 540, 99
N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc., 532 P.2d
1377 (Okla. 1974); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971); Gravis
v. Parke-Davis & Co., 503 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
This method of utilizing the physician to transmit information to the patient was
employed by the IUD industry as evidenced by the testimony of a manufacturer's
representative in the Fountain Hearings at 339.
IUDs
33Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
comprehensible to the patient. 149 There is no duty on the part of the
manufacturer to ensure that his warning actually reaches the con-
sumer; once he has made a full disclosure to the physician his duty has
been fulfilled.150 Warning procedures take another tack when the
product is sold directly to the consumer or when the product is dis-
pensed to the general public other than by a physician. The manufac-
turer is then required to convey his warning directly to the ultimate
consumer.1 51 Thus, if the above standards are made applicable to
IUD manufacturers, in those instances in which an IUD is prescribed
by a paramedic from a family planning clinic, the manufacturer will
not have fulfilled his duty merely by transmitting his warning to
the clinic; he must also ensure that it reaches the intended user.1 5
2
In addition to the above general rules, there are two additional
theories regarding the "agency" role assumed by the physician in the
warning process. The first is that he occupies the position of a dual
agent representing both the manufacturer and the patient concom-
itantly, and the second is that he is solely the agent of the manufac-
turer. These theories should be considered whenever the manufacturer
expressly advises the patient in his brochure to consult the physician
for additional information about the product. Such suggestions have
the legal import of ascribing an agent's role to the physician and a
principal's role to the manufacturer, with liability attaching to the
principal for any false or erroneous representations made by the
agent.153
149 See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Schenebeck v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399
F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966);
Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967); Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co.,
502 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
50 See Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cit. 1969); Davis v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Nishida v. E.I. DuPont DeMemours &
Co., 245 F.2d 768 (1957); Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1972);
Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971); Love v. Wolf,
226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964); Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,
214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1963); Mulder v. Parke-Davis & Co., 181
N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1970); Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d 863 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1973).
11See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974) (where there is mass
immuization or an ongoing program the prescription drug exception does not apply -
the warning must go to the consumer directly); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399
F.2d 121 (9th Cit. 1968) (over-the-counter or mass immunization requires that the
warning reach the consumer); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co. Inc., 532 P.2d 1377
(Okla. 1974) (where there are mass immunizations the duty runs to the public directly).
'
2 Id. This conclusion is strongly suggested by these cases. The IUD industry is aware that
many users receive their device from a paramedic without first engaging in consultation
with a physician. Although this is not a mass immunization situation, the manufacturer
must ensure that his warning reaches the consumer because there is no physician directly
involved in the prescription process.
s3 For a discussion of these theories see Note, Liability for the Failure of Contraceptive
Devices, 3 RUTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 489, 497 & nn. 38-44 (1972), and Rheingold, supra
note 60, at 976 & n. 168.
Although these theories are not extensively utilized, they would be applicable to the
IUD situation because the manufacturers' brochures instruct the patient to consult her
physician for additional information. See, e.g., Fountain Hearings at 79.
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When a consumer is injured by a product and is able to show the
inadequacy of the manufacturer's warning, the law raises a rebuttable
presumption that any warning which might have been given would
have been heeded. 154 The burden is on the manufacturer to show that
the possible adverse reactions excluded from the warning were so
inconsequential or the likelihood of their occurrence so miniscule that,
were they to have been included in the warning, the consumer would
have nevertheless purchased the product.155 If the manufacturer suc-
cessfully rebuts this presumption, the jury will then be instructed
to apply an objective reasonable man standard - i.e., if the warning
had been complete, would a reasonably prudent person have refrained
from purchasing the product?15 6
With the foregoing as a foundation, an examination of the specific
causes of action in which these principles may be utilized can now be
undertaken.
Warranty
The manufacturer's knowledge relative to the safety and efficacy
of the IUD is superior to that of the consumer. As in the case of a drug
manufacturer, the IUD manufacturer should be held to the standard
of an expert in the production of his product, 157 and after production
he should not be permitted to engage in any "puffing" during his
advertising efforts. This is necessary since, were it otherwise, the
likelihood is great that the consumer would be misled into believing
these statements comprised express warranties. Consequently, any
statements of opinion contained in the promotional material may be
considered assertions of fact and thereby incorporated into what-
ever express warranty the manufacturer actually intended to give. 158
In addition to these express warranties, the manufacturer is held by
law to impliedly warrant that his product will be reasonably fit for
its intended purpose.1 59 These warranties, express and implied, extend
to those persons whom the manufacturer intended to be the ultimate
consumers of his product, even though they may not have purchased
154Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1974).
15 Id.
157 See note 124 supra and accompanying text.
158Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967)
The court relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 542 (1965) in holding
that the statements of a party with suprior knowledge will be construed as fact and not
opinion. See also, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313.
l UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315. See also Tinnerholm v. Parke-Davis & Co., 411
F.2d 48 (2d Cit. 1969); Brown v. Globe Laboratories, Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151
(1957); Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967).
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the product directly from the manufacturer. 160 Therefore, the IUD
manufacturer warrants to the female user, the intended ultimate
consumer, that the product will be effective in preventing pregnancy
and that its use will not entail unreasonable risks of injury.
For an injured IUD plaintiff to recover under a warranty theory,
certain facts must be established: first, the IUD must have been sold
to the injured consumer; second, the warranties which ran with the
product must have been breached; and third, the manufacturer must
have been seasonably notified of the breach. The element most difficult
for an injured IUD user to establish will be the sale, for without this
requirement the warranties will not obtain and there can exist no
breach. Faced with this theory, the manufacturer can be expected to
argue that no direct sale occurred; instead the product was supplied
to the plaintiff as part of the overall service performed by her phy-
sician.16 1 Hopefully, the courts will reject this specious argument. By
virtue of the initial sale the manufacturer has propelled the IUD into
commerce. The warranties must logically follow the device on its
journey. Once the IUD has reached its ultimate destination, the con-
sumer, it is sheer folly to suggest that the warranties have somehow
vanished.1 62
Moreover, there is a distinct possibility that some courts may not
impose the sale requirement as a prerequisite to recovery because of
the product's similarity to foods and drugs. There is an exception
to the sale requirement which has been created for foods and drugs,
and the courts have held that when a product is designed to interfere
with a natural bodily function or is ingested into the body a manufac-
165 See Tinnerholm v. Parke-Davis & Co., 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969); Mannsz v. Macwhyte
Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cit. 1946); Oressman v. G. D. Searle & Co., 321 F. Supp. 449
.D... 11 v. Lamb 54 Cal. 2d .9, 2 P.2d 575 5 Cal. Rptr.
863 (1960); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612
(1958). See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318.
161 The situation is likely to be analogized to the case wherein a hospital adminsters impure
blood during a transfusion. Most courts refuse to find the hospital liable for breach of
warranty. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE § 9-6 (1972);
Leff, Medical Devices and Paramedical Personnel: A Preliminary Context for Emerging
Problems, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 332, 335 n.108; Note Unwanted Pregnancy and the Pill -
The Question of Liability of the Manufacturer, 41 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 335, 343 n.37
(1972).
162 See Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
In an action for damages against the manufacturers of the Salk vaccine, the Gottsdanker
court noted:
While the manufacturer of foods or drugs is not liable as a warrantor unless he
has made a sale, we see no reason to hold that he escapes liability because the
ultimate consumer, whose use of the product is the essential consideration in its
manufacture for the market, is not a purchaser under a contract of sale . . .While
a sale is essential to impose liability under the implied warranties, the initial sale
to distributor or retailer of pharmaceuticals is sufficient to impose upon the
manufacturer the responsibility of fulfilling the implied warranties which run
to the benefit of the persons whom the manufacturer intended to be, and who
in fact became, the 'consumers'.
Id. at 608, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
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turer will not be permitted to escape liability for any harm which
the product causes merely because the injured party did not technically
purchase the product. 163 The user will not be penalized simply because
the product was acquired by means other than direct purchase from
the manufacturer. Within this framework, the warranties extend
to the intended ultimate consumer or to those who could reasonably
be expected to use the product.
A defective product cannot be reasonably fit for its intended pur-
pose. When a product is sold in a defective condition the warranties are
deemed to have been breached and the manufacturer will be liable for
any injuries occasioned thereby. A product will be considered defective
if it can be shown that the manufacturer has breached his duty to
conduct adequate pre-marketing tests or has failed to give sufficient
warning of the product's propensity to harm.164 Thus, to prove the
IUD defective, the plaintiff need only show how pathetic were the
manufacturer's effort at pre-market testing and how insouciant were
the initial warnings when contrasted with the severity of the injuries
experienced by many IUD users. Furthermore, recovery will be made
all the more certain when the plaintiff contrasts the information
presented in the patient brochures with the information contained in
the medical literature. As in the case of a drug manufacturer, the IUD
manufacturer's status vis-A-vis the consumer being that of an ex-
pert, these statements in the patient brochures should attach to the
product as part of the express warranty and the consumer should
be entitled to rely thereon. If these express statements are shown to
be false, the warranty is breached, and the plaintiff should be en-
titled to recover.
The requirement that the manufacturer be notified of the breach
within a reasonable time does not appear to impede recovery. In an
action occasioned by an IUD manufacturer's breach of warranty the
notification requirement is designed to afford the seller an oppor-
tunity to prepare for negotiation and litigation.1 65 As such, it is
unlikely that a court will dismiss an action for want of notice or
unreasonably delayed notice when the filing of the lawsuit itself is
sufficient to satisfy this purpose.1 66
163 Id. at 608, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
64See Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969) (breach of duty to warn
causes product to be defective); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir.
1968) (failure to warn of existence and extent of risk renders drug unfit); Lewis v. Baker,
243 Ore. 317, 413 P.2d 400 (1966) (inadequate warning equals breach of warranty).
165See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607, Comment 4.
16 Recent courts faced with the issue have suggested that the notice requirement is inappli-
cable in actions for personal injury and in actions against remote sellers or manufacturers.
See Fischer v. Mead Johnson Laboratories, 41 App. Div. 2d 737 (1973); Hickman v.
Bross, 58 Pa. D. & C.2d 137 (C.P. 1972). Cf. Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Service,
468 P.2d 969 (Wyo. 1970) (held: notice requirement of § 2-607 inapplicable to manu-
facturer or retailer in action for property damages). But see Redfield v. Mead, Johnson &
(Continued on next page)
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Negligence
Action grounded on negligence should encompass negligent failure
to test, negligent design, and negligent failure to warn, although, if
the conduct of the IUD manufacturers toward the intended user is as
reprehensible as suggested by the material presented in the Fountain
Hearings, any one ground should be sufficient for recovery.
The failure to adequately warn and the occasionally pernicious
designs can be traced initially to the inadequate pre-market testing
conducted by the manufacturers. The general rule regarding testing is:
[W] here experiment or research is necessary to determine
the presence or the degree of danger, the product must not
be tried out on the public, nor must the public be expected
to possess the facilities or the technical knowledge to learn
for itself of inherent but latent dangers. The claim that a
hazard was not foreseen is not available to one who did not
use foresight appropriate to his enterprise. 167
This standard should be applicable to the IUD industry. Not only is
the IUD a product that is intimately connected with a delicate and
complex female organ, but it is also the type of product that the
average consumer is unable to assess on the basis of her general
knowledge. Therefore, if the testing is shown to be grossly inade-
quate, the IUD manufacturers cannot then complain that the product's
lethal qualities were unknown since the manufacturers did not use
the "foresight appropriate to [their] enterprise" to determine the
product's propensity to harm.
Nor may an individual manufacturer evade liability on the basis
that his conduct comported with that of the industry as a whole, for
in light of the above standard it is apparent that the entire industry
was negligent. In the words of the late Justice Holmes, "What usually
is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought
to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it
is usually complied with or not. ' 168 In view of the fact that a multitude
of the problems were experienced with the first generation IUDs,
169
prudence would dictate that cautious manufacturers assiduously test
(Continued from preceeding page)
Co., 512 P.2d 776 (Ore. 1973) where the court, in reversing and remanding, gave leave
to amend the complaint to include an allegation of notice. Although Redheld would seem
to indicate that the court felt constrained to adhere to the letter of § 2-607, there was no
need to do otherwise. Indeed, these cases are alike in their most fundamental aspect -
the courts unanimously refused to dismiss the action for lack of notice.
167 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 51-52 (1953) (dissenting opinion), quoted with
approval in Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cit. 1973). See also note
172 infra for cases which have applied this principle to the manufacturer's duty to warn.
168 Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903). See also The T. J. Hopper,
60 F.2d 737 (2d Cit. 1932) (opinion by L. Hand, J.).
169 See note 10 supra.
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the second generation models prior to releasing them for general dis-
tribution. Yet such testing was never performed. On the basis of a few
glowing reports, the earlier problems were overlooked, and the market
was flooded with the newer models 170 - much to the eventual dismay
of many unsuspecting users. This conduct is arguably unreasonable
under the circumstances, especially when considering the gravity and
magnitude of the injuries which surfaced soon after the products
were released. Such maleficients as septicemia inducing multifilament
strings and radiolucent devices that necessitate surgery after migra-
tion could have been discovered prior to marketing if the testing had
even approached sufficiency. 171 Where, as should be done here, the
manufacurer is held to the standard of an expert in designing and
producing his product, he cannot complain that he was unaware of
the defects in design when he did not use the requisite degree of dili-
gence in testing his product prior to marketing. Indeed the fact that
these defects surfaced so soon after general distribution further sug-
gests this conclusion.
Another consequence of this insufficient testing has been to neces-
sarily render inadequate any warning given by the manufacturer to
the physician. The manufacturer cannot plead that the hazards of use
were unforeseen when he negligently failed to test his product.1 7 2
If the injury suffered by the plaintiff was not included in the warning,
when such injury was reasonably foreseeable or capable of discovery
during the testing process, any consent to the insertion of the IUD
that was given by the patient is vitiated, and, as a consequence, the
manufacturer should be estopped from defending on the basis of
assumption of the risk. The patient cannot assume a risk of which she
is unaware.1 73 When the warnings given to the physician do not ade-
quately apprise him of the reasonably foreseeable hazards attendant
to the product's use, the manufacturer's duty to warn has been
breached.1 74 When this occurs, the patient is unable to give an informed
consent because the physician was not able to adequately instruct and
advise,1 75 and, since uninformed consent is no consent at all,176 the
170 See notes 11-20 and accompanying text supra.
171 See note 204 infra.
172 Kershaw v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 415 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1969) (where manufacturer
reasonably should have known of the dangers, he must give warning); Christofferson v.
Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1971) (duty to warn
applies where manufacturer "has knowledge or by the application of reasonably developed
human skill and foresight should have knowledge of the danger").
173 Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974) (there can be no assumption
of risk where there was inadequate warning or no warning at all).
174De Vito v. United Airlines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
175 For a discussion of the duty of the physician, see text accompanying note 206 infra.
176 Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 473, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 559 (1973) ("an
uninformed consent to surgery obtained from a patient lacking knowledge of the dangers
inherent in the procedure is no consent at all").
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patient has assumed no risk. When, thereafter, the patient sustains
an injury the possibility of which she was not warned, she is entitled
to recover her damages directly from the manufacturer. The physi-
cian is deemed to be the agent of the patient for the purpose of re-
ceiving the manufacturer's warning, and this agency relationship
allows the right to recover for inadequate warning to inure to her
benefit. 17
Another method to prove the inadequacy of the warning is to
show that what scant warnings were given were canceled by a barrage
of promotional material replete with false and misleading information.
A product manufacturer may not evade liability for an injury caused
by his product merely because the possibility of its occurrence was
included in his warning when the overall effect of his advertising
campaign induced the consumer to utilize his product in spite of the
fact that such use may bode ill.178 To show motive for such watered
down warnings, the plaintiff need only introduce evidence of the huge
economic benefits to be gained by the industry from the product's
wide-spread acceptance. 179 As previously noted, the staggering pro-
fits certainly provide ample inducement for zealous overpromotion.
In addition to effectively canceling any warnings given, these
promotional materials appear to have been statutory violations and
hence may be considered to be negligence per se. 180 When the labeling
accompanying a product contains even one false statement, the
product is considered to be misbranded and in violation of the statute
designed to prevent such overtly misleading practices. 181 The same
holds true for advertisements expressing only half-truths. 8 2 Thus,
even though the FTC and FDA have allowed the IUD manufacturers
to violate these statutes with relative impunity, a court should not
be so indifferent to their actions. Since these statutes were enacted to
177 Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969);
Weschler v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 198 Misc. 540, 99 N.Y.S. 2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
178 See note 147 supra.
17' Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964).
180 See Gober v. Revlon, Inc. 317 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1963) (violation is negligence per se);
Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960) (violation is negligence
per se); Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (statutory violation
may be the basis of civil liability if injured person is member of class for whose benefit
the statute was enacted and the harm resulting from the violation is of the type the
statute was designed to prevent); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d
689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) (violation raises a presumption of negligence).
181 See United States v. 2000 Plastic Tubular Cases, etc., 231 F. Supp. 236 (M.D. Pa. 1964),
aff'd, 352 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1966) (if any single
claim in the labeling is false or misleading, the device is misbranded). See also Research
Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 167 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
843 (1948) (evidence of scientific half-truths used in promotional literature and in label
was sufficient to establish charge of misbranding).
t82 Aronberg v. Federal Trade Commission, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942) (the Act forbids
dissemination of any misleading advertisement which fails to reveal facts material in view
of the consequences of the use of a commodity).
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protect the consumer, once the plaintiff is able to show that these
statutory violations contributed to her injury by inducing her to
purchase the product, the liability of the IUD industry for its negli-
gent failure to warn appears to be ineluctable.
Intentional Misrepresentation
After close scrutiny of the industry's utilization of "test results"
for advertising purposes, it should be concluded that the distorted
information disseminated to physicians and their patients amounts
to a deliberate misrepresentation. The life-table method, for example,
was designed solely for use by clinicians in their attempts to statis-
tically evaluate the efficacy and safety of IUDs. Since it utilizes a
fluid rather than a controlled study group it is at best a quasi-
scientific tool whose results are often conjectural. 183
183 Upon insertion of an IUD, women are permitted to enter the study group at any time
during the compilation of data, and for every month they are under observation one
"woman month" is tallied and the results recorded. Women are also permitted to leave
the study group at any time, in which event these patients are deemed "lost to follow-up,"
and for statistical purposes are considered to follow the same pattern and yield the same
results as those continuing in the study. This is, of course, deceiving because the reasons
for dropping out of the study are varied and can encompass pregnancy or removal of the
device by physicians not participating in the study. Much criticism throughout the Hearings
was directed at this methodology in dealing with lost to follow up patients. One example
of such criticism is the testimony of Dr. Madry:
[AIII "lost" patients are eliminated from consideration in presentation of final
results on the basis that "lost" patients are identical to those not lost. I am aware
of no other studies related to patient care, in any of its aspects, where such a
presumptuous, fallacious, mathematical formula has been applied to evaluation
of experimental results obtained in human beings subject to medical treatment
of any kind.
Fountain Hearings at 10.
Moreover, while the test data might indicate a greater number of "woman months"
over the span of the test, there is no indication of how many women were under obser-
vation for only a short period of time. Women who are observed for only a few months
following insertion would most probably not become pregnant if the manufacturer's sug-
gestion to use an additional method of birth control during this initial term is followed.
As the number of birth control methods used increases the likelihood of pregnancy
decreases. Therefore, inclusion in the study of women who start early in the test cycle
but leave before completion, or women who enter late in the test cycle, would appear
to make the study's credibility doubtful. Supportative of this criticism is a letter from
Dr. Thomsen to an IUD manufacturer, December 15, 1972:
The four studies quoted (Davis, Earl, Ostergard, Gabrielson) are probably
the best you could find for your advertisement. But, these are pathetically inade-
quate studies in evaluating the effectiveness and complications of an interauterine
device ....
[ . . (The] Davis study covered a time period of 12 months with 640 inser-
tions and 3,549 woman-months of use. This simply means that the study covered
640 insertions with the average of time used by each insertion being only 5.5
months. Earl's study covers a little more time (8.6 months average insertion time),
but Ostergard and Gabrielson give pathetic average insertion study times of
only 4.3 and 4.9 months respectively. Need I point out that the grand average
of your four quoted studies involving 3,174 insertions covering 17,222 woman-
months gives an equally patetic average insertion study time of only 5.4 months.
In your own ad you suggest "A supplemental contraceptive method . . .
during a 2-3 month post-insertion adjustment phase." If that three month period
is subtracted from the 5.4 months average insertion study time one comes to the
startling conclusion that you are selling this product with an add that really
makes claims based on a partial guarantee covering only about 2.4 months of
average time during which the [IUD) is the only form of contraception
recommended . ...
See also note 93 supra.
19751
41Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Because of this innate deficiency, the method was never intended
to generate statistics which would form the basis of an advertising
campaign. 184 The manufacturers knew this, yet they energetically
heralded these statistics despite the fact that, when utilized in an
advertising campaign, they are insidiously deceptive since their use
in an advertisement indicates that they are sufficient, by themselves,
to prove safety or efficacy. 185
Another odious advertising practice engaged in by IUD manufac-
turers was to select from available information only those facts bene-
ficial in propagandizing their product, while disregarding those which
would be detrimental.1 86 This, of course, is repugnant to even the most
rudimentary sense of fairplay, and is especially repulsive when the
damaging information concealed relates to an issue of religious or
moral belief. Although medical science is not yet certain how an IUD
works, there is evidence that it operates not as a contraceptive but
rather as an abortifacient.18 7 This information was ignored in pro-
motional material, no doubt because, were this fact generally known,
the many women who consider abortion as morally unacceptable would
never have considered using an IUD.1 88 This deceit was further ex-
14 See note 93 supra.
185 See note 183 supra. Furthermore, testimony by Dr. Anello (Director, Division of Statistics,
Office of Scientific Coordination, Bureau of Drugs] was that life table studies, by them-
selves, are not adequate in the FDA's opinion to establish safety or efficacy. Fountain
Hearings at 419. For an example of one manufacturer's use of the life-table method
in an advertisement, see note 117 supra.
186 One example of this deceptive reporting is given by Dr. Thomsen:
[One manufacturer's] advertisement assured gynecologists that the large surface
area of the device was designed for maximum coverage of the endometrium and,
thereby, maximum contraceptive effect: But the ad did not mention that maximum
coverage of the endometrium might mean maximum side effects from bleeding
and cramping, both known to be related to large surface coverage of IUD's.
Fountain Hearings at 61.
,67 See note 20 supra.
188 Not only did the manufacturers have to contend with the moral views of American women
on the abortion issue, but even prior to extensive marketing in this country the same
issue had to be faced in overseas marketing. Religious countries, such as Pakistan, would
never condone utilization of an abortifacient; therefore, in the Second International Con-
ference on Intrauterine Contraception held in New York City in 1964,
discussion was begun on the abortifiacient capability of IUD's. Candidly express-
ing that an abortifacient label would be detrimental to promoting the device
in underdeveloped countries like Pakistan, where abortion is strongly opposed,
the population planners began to redefine abortion and pregnancy.
In considering redefinition, the likelihood that IUD's destroy blastocysts prior
to implantation led the planners to consider defining the blastocyst out of exis-
tence. Pregnancy, they said, should be redefined to begin at implantation. It seems
that all subsequent scientific conferences on the "Preimplantation Stages of
Pregnancy" were to be considered mere fiction.
Later, a scientific group of the World Health Organization (WHO) gave
careful consideration to the proper name for these devices. After considering such
names as "Intrauterine foreign body" (IUFB), "Intrauterine contraceptive device"
(IUCD), and "Intrauterine device" (IUD) they unanimously accepted the
name "intrauterine device" (IUD) with the recommendation that it be
universally used in the medical literature. However, most articles in the
(Continued on next page)
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acerbated in at least one instance when a manufacturer made the
unqualified statement in his patient brochure that IUDs definitely
do not cause abortion. 189
IUD manufacturers also evinced a reluctance to incorporate into
their warnings any reports of the many adverse reactions of which
they were aware until the number achieved substantial proportions. 190
Moreover, they refused to take cognizance of the many inimical re-
ports which were brought to their attention unless these were published
in the medical literature. 191 In fact, one example was given wherein the
manufacturer went so far as to base his entire advertising campaign on
the results achieved during the first nine months of a completed
eighteen month study even though the results of the first half were
directly contravened by those of the study as a whole. 192 He then
defended this tactic on the ground that only the first half of the
study was published. 193 Such an argument is outrageous since the
(Continued from preceeding page)
literature, written primarily through grants from the Ford Foundation and the
Population Council, have ignored this recommendation and continued to use
intrauterine contraceptive device. This rhetorical ploy is in direct contradiction
to the mounting scientific evidence that the principal mode of action of the IUD
as a "contraceptive device" is not the prevention of conception but, rather, the
destruction of the human blastocyst prior to implantation.
Hilgers, supra note 4, at 501.
189 Testimony of Russel J. Thomsen, M.D., Kennedy Hearings, supra note 3, at 167.
190 See note 122 supra and accompanying text.
191 The reason given by the manufacturers for ignoring the unpublished studies in their
advertisements was that the unpublished studies had not yet passed the stringent standards
demanded by an editorial board of an Ob-Gyn publication. There is logic to this argument.
However, there is also limit. When the unpublished studies evidence adverse reactions either
different or in greater incidence than the published studies, the manufacturer's obligation
to warn the consumer of adverse effects is not fulfilled by ignoring the unpublished studies
simply because they are unpublished. The fact of publication is not in issue, the possibility
of adverse effects and the need to warn thereof is. The manufacturer must be concerned
not from where the adverse information came, but with what steps must be taken to
ascertain if the information is accurate, and if accurate, how to warn the consumer.
Furthermore, testimony in the Fountain Hearings at 117, by Dr. Thomsen, brought
to light the fact that, prior to publishing the advertisement found in note 117 supra, the
particular manufacturer had other studies in its files which were not utilized in the
advertisement because of their less favorable results.
192 See statement by Mr. Fountain, Fountain Hearings at 404-05. Mr. Fountain then stated:
The updated study shows that the pregnancy rate had risen from 1.9 percent,
as indicated in the ad, to 5.1 percent for the 18-month study. The medical
removals shown in the . . . ad at 14.9 percent had risen to 26.4 percent . . .
The dropout rate after 18 months was 31 percent....
The ad also failed to state - that Dr. Gabrielson, after 18 months, had
stated in the report ....
Because of the substantial pregnancy rate found in our series, we are cur-
rently advising IUD patients to use a second simple method of contraception ....
from day 9 to day 16 of the month . ...
The overall infection rate noted in our series was 5 percent. Four patients
were ill enough to be hospitalized; one required a laparotomy.
Id. at 405.
1 Fountain Hearings at 303.
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manufacturer knows that it is impossible for the physician to ascer-
tain the veracity of the information contained in an advertisement.1 94
The physician has grown to rely on the manufacturers' representa-
tions concerning his product since the time needed to glean all of the
relevant information from the medical journals is simply not avail-
able. Furthermore, both physician and patient alike tend to labor
under the misconception that the FDA and FTC continually monitor
the activities of the prescription drug and device industries in an effort
to ensure that the manufacturers' representations are accurate. Albeit,
as the Fountain Hearings so demonstrated, such is not the case.
To allow the IUD industry to have capitalized on this situation
without regard to the injurious consequences to a substantial number
of users would be a travesty of justice. The quest for economic gain
cannot be so unfettered as to allow a manufacturer to misrepresent
his product under these circumstances; and therefore, any judgment
awarded would be incomplete if it did not include a sizeable comple-
ment of exemplary damages.1 95
Strict Liability
In those states where the doctrine of strict liability in tort has
been accepted, the liability of the IUD manufacturer should be vir-
tually assured. Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts instructs
that one who sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the consumer will be liable for any injury occasioned
19 The manufacturer who utilized only the first nine months of an eighteen month study
in his advertisement, on the basis that the last nine months was not included in a
published study, asserted that the physician did have an avenue for verification of the
advertisement. He suggested that since all inquiries by physicians concerning the product
were answered by presenting "him with all of the data, published, unpublished, case
reports, and even data that wasn't handled appropriately, for comparison," then there
can be "no inference, to the best of [his] knowledge, of an intent to mislead anyone."
Fountain Hearings at 312.
The problem with this manufacturer's reasoning is that it begs the issue. Certainly
physicians can not be expected to have to write to manufacturers for information needed
to decipher advertisements. The manufacturer's statements in the advertisements should
be capable of accurate interpretation (and not misleading) without resort to outside
resources. If the physician must use outside materials to weed the false from the true
statements, the advertisement cannot be termed other than deceptive.
195 Malice in fact, once established by the evidence, will ground an award of puntive damages
where "there is evidence that the conduct in question is taken recklessly and without
regard to its injurious consequences." Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d
689, 713, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 415 (1967). See Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 116 P. 530
(1911) (wilful misrepresentation grounds for an award of punitive damages); Sturges
v. Charles L. Harney, Inc., 165 Cal. App. 2d 306, 320, 331 P.2d 1072, 1080 (1958)
(award of punitive damages sustained due to defendant's wilful and reckless conduct
showing an utter disregard of possible injury to others). See generally Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d
1021 (1970) for a discussion of the allowance of punitive damages in product liability
cases.
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thereby.196 This rule will apply even though the manufacturer has
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product.
197
To resolve whether the defect rendered the product unreasonably
dangerous, it is necessary to determine if the injury occasioned by
the IUD was of the type that the ordinary consumer would have con-
templated at the time of purchase. If the consumer could not have
reasonably foreseen the danger inherent in the defective product and
was not forewarned the manufacturer will be held strictly liable.198
As previously discussed, a product that enters the market with an
inadequate warning is ipso facto defective. 199 Since this appears to
be the case with the IUD, the plaintiff need only show that this
inadequate warning rendered the IUD unreasonably dangerous -
a task of little effort since the many serious injuries sustained by
IUD users were, because of the manufacturer's glib overpromotions,
not anticipated by even the most knowledgeable people in the area
of birth control, let alone the average consumer. 200
Of course, the manufacturer will counter with the argument that
the IUD should be exempted from the general rules for strict liability
on the basis of the "unavoidably unsafe" exception, provided by
196 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965):
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
197 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (2) (a) (1965).
198RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g (1965):
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it
leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment j (1965):
In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller
may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use.
See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Basko v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App.
2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d
424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
199 See Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); Grinnell v. Charles
Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969); Incollingo v. Ewing,
444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971). See also note 164 supra.
250The manufacturers should be "the most knowledgeable" of the adverse effects of their
product, but because of the inadequate testing done even they were not aware of the
inherent dangers. This being the situation, information from the manufacturer to the
physician must also be inadequate; and, it therefore becomes impossible for the consumer
to be apprised of the possible adverse effects, since none of the "knowledgeable people
in the area of birth control" knew the adverse effects.
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comment k of section 402A. 201 For comment k to apply two require-
ments must be met: the product must be incapable of being made
safe within the present state of human knowledge, and the product
must possess such a high degree of social utility that its use is war-
ranted despite this fact.
Under these requirements the IUD should not qualify for exception
from the general strict liability provisions for unreasonably unsafe
products. The IUD is certainly not the sine qua non for birth control
as is the Pasteur vaccine for the treatment of rabies. 20 2 With the
many alternative methods of birth control available,20 3 the IUD can
hardly be considered so necessary that women would have to be sub-
jected to its many inherent dangers rather than choose a substitute
method. Even more damaging to the manufacturer is that defects in
the product, such as infection inducing multifilament strings and
migratory radiolucent designs, could have been discovered prior to
general distribution if adequate testing had been conducted. 20 4
Moreover, even when a manufacturer meets the requirements of
comment k and his product is deemed "unavoidably unsafe," one
further step must be taken to avoid liability. The manufacturer must
give proper warning of the defect.20 5 Since the IUDs were marketed
201 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965):
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state
of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An
outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not
uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected.
Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing
and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, not withstanding the unavoidable
high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines,
and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except
to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular
of many new or cxperimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and
opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety,
or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is
justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recogniz-
able risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they
are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate conse-
quences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the
public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known
but apparently reasonable risk.
102 See example in comment k, note 201 supra.
203 See note 2 supra.
21 Such is the only logical conclusion when other clincians, testing the manufacturer's product,
and utilizing simple experiments, discovered the flaws. See Tatum, Schmidt, Phillips,
McCarty, O'Leary, The Dalkon Sheild Controversy, Structural and Bacteriological Studies
of IUD Tails, 231 J.A.M.A. 711 (1975); Thomsen, IUD Complications - Radiological
Aspects of Diagnosis, 5 CONTEMP. OB. GYN. 77 (1975).
11 Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cit. 1974); Borel v. Fiberboard Paper
Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cit. 1973); Toole v. Richard-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal.
App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d
424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969); Cunningham v. Mac Neal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443,
266 N.E.2d 897 (1970); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
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with grossly inadequate warnings they cannot, by any stretch of the
imagination, be considered as "unavoidably unsafe," and thus the
manufacturers should not be permitted to escape liability for the
injuries caused by their products.
The Physician
Any discussion of potential physician liability is at once com-
plicated by the fact that a minority in the medical profession con-
sider this method of contraception so hazardous that to prescribe an
IUD is malpractice per se.20 6 Moreover, there is also disagreement
as to whether the insertion of an IUD should be considered a surgical
procedure, thereby necessitating the completion of written consent
forms prior to insertion.20 7 These differences notwithstanding, in the
interest of simplicity, this note will consider only the duty of dis-
closing information relative to the potential adverse reactions which
may be experienced by the patient.
When prescribing an IUD, there are certain duties imposed upon
the physician. First, he must obtain the informed consent of his
patient, and after consent is procured he must exercise due care in
the insertion process. Also, the physician who utilizes the services
of a paramedic may be held liable on the basis of respondeat superior.
Since these potential sources of liability can logically be separated
into discrete functions, they will be discussed seriatim.
Informed Consent
Because of its nature, the IUD can be distinguished from the other
types of prescription medication dispensed by a physician. There
is no question here of a physician, after diagnosing his patient's ills,
relying on his many years of education and experience to select the
appropriate medication entailing the least risk for the most effective
treatment of the malady.2 8 The patient comes to the physician only for
the prescription of a safe and effective method of birth control. There-
fore, the duty of the physician is to discuss with his patient all avail-
able methods of contraception, delineating the advantages and dis-
advantages of each. 20 9 Moreover, the disclosure as to possible adverse
206 Letters from Dr. Madry to the FTC, Fountain Hearings at 7, in which he stated:
From the medical point of view, recommendation of the IUD as a method of
contraception superior to the "Pill", or causative of fewer complications than
the "Pill", is per se malpractice.
207 Deming, supra note 32, at 1.
208 When a physician is prescribing medication, he may be entitled to withhold information
that would have a detrimental effect on the mental or emotional state of his patient. How-
ever, for this therapeutic privilege to exist there usually must be some dread disease and
the information withheld must be of a character that would jeopardize recovery because
it would make the patient unstable or depressed. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ.
Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957); Natanson v. Kline, 186
Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
20. Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967).
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reactions must be complete so that the patient has a rational basis
upon which to make an informed choice. 210 The physician may not
choose the method which he thinks is best; the final decision must
be that of the patient.211 Of course, the physician must decline to
prescribe the method selected if such declination is so indicated by
the patient's medical history, but in those instances where there has
been a full and fair disclosure of all the information to which he has
been made privy by the manufacturer, the physician will be absolved
of any liability for the patient's choice.2 12
Insertion
The insertion of an IUD is an extremely delicate procedure, and
because the technique may vary depending upon which brand is
chosen, it is extremely important that the manufacturer's instruc-
tions be followed carefully. If a perforation occurs, any deviation
from such directions may be sufficient to render the physician liable
for the injury.2 13 Moreover, it has even been suggested that because
the insertion requires such a high degree of skill, no physician should
attempt the procedure unless he has taken a postgraduate course in
the subject.2 14 The necessary corollary to this hypothesis, then, is
210 Salgo v. Leland. Stanford, Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170
(1957) (a physician may not minimize known dangers in order to induce a patient's
consent); Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div.2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973) (there
must be a reasonable disclosure of the known dangers incident to the proposed treatment).
211 Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960) (the law does not permit
the physician to substitute his own judgement for that of the patient).
212 The test to be applied by the jury is what a reasonable medical practitioner would have
disclosed under the same or similar circumstances. Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo.
1965). However, the courts are split as to who must supply the standard. The Aiken
Court, for example, held that the plaintiff must introduce expert medical testimony on
this subject. On the other hand, in Fogal v. Genessee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344
N.Y.S.2d 552 (4th Dept. 1973), the court, after an exhaustive review of the authority,
adopted the reasoning set forth in Canterbury v. Spence,464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972),viz:
duty and scope of disclosure arise apart from medical considerations and are not governed
by the profession's standards of due care, but by the general standard of conduct reasonable
under all the circustances. Under this theory, the jury may consider evidence of custom
but needn't be bound thereby because it is possible that the entire medical community
was negligent. Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
213 Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1963).
However, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447 (1965), provides that the
manufacturer will remain liable if the physician's intervening negligence is reasonably
foreseeable. Hence, if the manufacturer's insertion instructions are incomplete, a physician
who negligently inserts an IUD may not be liable because his conduct should have been
reasonably foreseeable.
214 Dr. Ostergard testified in the Fountain Hearings at 336 as follows:
Mr. Thompson. If you were a doctor, without your particular detailed back-
ground in this area, and a patient requested an IUD, what pattern would you
follow to determine the proper way to insert this device:
Dr. Ostergard. I am assuming the particular physician in question has
had no experience with the uterine devices in the past?
Mr. Thompson. Correct.
Dr. Ostergard. I think that particular physician would be well advised
to refer this patient to someone who had had experience in the insertion of
(Continued on next page)
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that any physician who attempts to perform an insertion without
having taken such a course is ipso facto negligent. While this view
may not find broad support, it does illustrate the dangers involved
in the insertion process and indicate the need for specific physician
training. Although a physician who has performed a number of
insertions without mishap may escape liability by arguing proven
expertise, it would well behoove a novice to refer his patients to an
experienced colleague until he has obtained the requisite training,
especially since the manufacturer can be expected to argue that a
perforation occurs only during the insertion procedure. Of course,
the benchmark for the imposition of liablity will be provided by the
general practices of the medical community, 215 but where the physi-
cian has obtained the necessary expertise and has carefully followed
the manufacturer's instructions, the prospect that a jury will find
him to have conformed to the required standard of due care seems
favorable.
Respondeat Superior
In those instances where a physician utilizes the services of a
paramedic, the paramedic must conform to the above discussed
standards. For deviation, the physician will be held vicariously liable,
since such actions were clearly done within the scope of employ-
ment.216 This doctrine also applies to those family planning clinics
which utilize the services of paramedics to perform insertions-
indeed it is in this situation that the doctrine will most likely apply
since relatively few physicians employ paramedics while the clinics
do so extensively. The clinic has the responsibility to ensure that all
of its personnel have the required degree of skill to effect error free
insertions.2 17 Moreover, it is especially important that the clinic
ensures the patient's right to select the method of birth control. There-
fore the paramedic, as the physician, may not withhold information
of possible adverse side effects of one method in an effort to channel
the patient's choice to another. He may advise and counsel based on
(Continued from preceeding page)
uterine devices. If he wished to pursue it himself, he would be advised to seek
a post-graduate education course that would allow him to be instructed in the
best technique in the uterine device insertion, preferably with a structural
experience in a clinical population, such as the experience I described through
our federally funded grant, as physicians do not have this opportunity to come
to a clinic and actually learn this device.
21s For a compendium of fairly recent judicial formulations of the malpractice standard, see
Leff, supra note 161, at 397-99.
216 This is no more than a reiteration of the basic priniciple set forth in the RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 243 (1958). For an excellent and thorough discussion of
paramedics and the imputation of liability for their negligence to physicians, see Leff, supra
note 161.
217 Id. See also Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373
(1967).
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the patient's medical history and economic status, but he may. not
choose. When these standards have been breached, there is no informed
consent; consequently, if an injury ensues the clinic will be liable.218
Conclusion
This note has endeavored to bring the ills caused by the IUD
industry to the attention of those in a position to alleviate them,
and further, hopefully illuminate a few of the many arguments which
can be made by plaintiff's counsel in a lawsuit against an IUD manu-
facturer. 219 Before closing, however, one additional practical thought
should be added. Whenever possible, it will generally be preferable to
join both the physician and the manufacturer as party defendants in
the same suit. Moreover, in those instances in which the injury com-
plained of is perforation of the uterus, it may even be mandatory if
the plaintiff is to be successful. 220 When both parties are joined, the
plaintiff's overall chance for success will be improved, for both
defendants will become plaintff's ally to the extent necessary to avoid
their own individual liability.221
In spite of the potential for success, the tragedy of this entire
episode is that for the majority of IUD injuries the culpable man-
ufacturers will never be brought to task. Most women are probably
not aware that the law will provide them with a remedy.22 2 And when
to the number of these women is added those who are reluctant to
seek a remedy because they are loath to involve their physician, 223
the likelihood of the IUD industry being held accountable for the
magnitude of the injuries which its reprehensible conduct occasioned
appears remote.
218Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967)
(hospital will be derivatively liable if a professional person employed by it commits an
act of malpractice under the doctrine of respondent superior or for the malpractice com-
mited by an indepenently-retained healer, if the hospital knows there is no informed con-
sent to the procedure).
219 Most of the evidence offered in the Fountain Hearings, is, of course, inadmissible to prove
a point in issue in an actual trial. However, by reviewing the data plaintiff's counsel will
be aware of what evidence should be introduced to show culpability. Furthermore, the
actual correspondence, referred to in the Fountain Hearings, is available through dis-
covery and must be supplied by the manufacturer. See, eg., Meyers v. G. D. Searle & Co.,
41 F.R.D. 290 (E.D. N.Y. 1966) (all correspondence between manufacturer and FDA
regarding product); Henard v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 129, 102 Cal. Rptr. 721
(1972) (all reports from physicians to manufacturer regarding product); Bristol-
Meyers Co. v. District Court, City and County of Denver, 161 Col. 354, 442 P.2d 373
(1967) (all documents regarding development and testing of product).
22 Since perforation occurs in one of two ways, either by negligent physician insertion or
migration of the IUD stemming from defective design, non-joinder of both parties may
allow the culpable defendant to escape unscathed. In two unreported cases involving only
physician-defendants, migration was determined to be the cause of the perforation and
no liability ensued. Johnson v. Ruller, Cal. Super. Ct., Orange Co., Docket # 174871
(Sept. 7, 1972); Hines v. Keiser Foundation Hosp., Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Co., Docket
# 395620 (Oct. 4, 1973).
221 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 108, § 34 A[41 [e), at 9A-29.
'Id. [1], at 9A-5.
222 See note 21 supra.
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It is precisely for this reason that the nonfeasance of the FDA
and FTC is so outrageous. The consumer will never receive adequate
protection unless these agencies assiduously assume their responsi-
bilities and diligently perform their duties. To help ensure that this
will come to pass, it is imperative that Congress enact new device
legislation requiring that device manufacturers prove to the satis-
faction of the FDA that their products are safe and effective prior to
general distribution. 224 Only in this way can recurrence of a tragedy
such as that caused by the IUD industry be prevented. Common sense
demands that never again should a situation be allowed to arise when,
after years of distribution and thousands of serious injuries, an in-
vestigative committee of Congress must be told about a product:
The IUD of today is reputed to date from some 2,000 years
ago when stones were placed by camel drivers into the
wombs of their beasts of burden. The camel driver knew not
how the stone prevented pregnancy, but he knew that it
did work some times. If the animal became sick or died,
then the camel driver undoubtedly asked his gods the nature
22 It is a sad testimonial to the previous bills passed regarding food, drug and cosmetic regula-
tion that in order to establish the necessary impetus for their passage a grave public
disaster acted as a catalyst. "Had it not been for the public impact of Upton Sinclair's
The Jungle, with its description of the horrors of the American meat processing
industry .... [the 1906 Federal Food and Drugs Act] might not have passed." Davidson,
supra note 64, at 408. The 1906 Act did not require pre-market testing of drugs, and
the "Elixer Sulfanilamide" disaster in which at least seventy-three persons died forced
the legislature to enact the 1938 amendments requiring that drugs receive FDA approval
prior to marketing. Id. at 409-11. The 1962 Amendments broadened the FDA's powers -
but these were enacted as a direct result of the public clamor following the Thalidomide
tragedy. Id. at 412. Will the IUD be the next catalyst?
President Nixon, in his consumer message to Congress in 1969, urged that
Certain minimum standards should be established for devices; the government
should be given additional authority to require premarket clearance in certain
cases.
Statement of Senator Gaylord Nelson, Fountain Hearings at 46. "To date there has been
no new legislation. The medical device industry is large and powerful, and its lobbying
pressures have been felt." Although figures vary, Senator Nelson stated that in 1971 the
industry's retail sales topped 3 billion dollars, a figure which will double by 1981. Id.
The Cooper Committee, a study group commissioned to make recommendations for new
device legislation following President Niron's message to Congress, reported
that there was a medical device hazards problem, and that while its exact mag-
nitude could not be quantified, there were convincing "indicators" of its
dimensions. For example, an FDA tally of several hundred articles published
since 1963 reporting problems associated with medical devices shows 512
deaths and 300 injuries associated with heart valves, 89 deaths and 186
injuries associated with pacemakers, 47 deaths and several injuries associated with
anesthesia machines, 28 deaths and 171 injuries associated with catheters of
various kinds, over 8,000 injuries associated with IUD's, over 2,000 injuries
associated with radiation equipment, and hundreds of injuries associated with
a wide variety of prosthetic and orthopedic devices, dental equipment, sutures,
syringes, heating pads and blankets, and contact lenses.
Copper, supra note 48, at 170 (emphasis added). The Cooper Committee Report was
made public in September 1970, but as yet Congress has not acted. Only prompt action
will thwart the established legislative pattern - new device amendments must preceed
the tragedy. . 1
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of the offense he had committed; he certainly had no concep-
tion of rates of morbidity or mortality due to "camel stones."
We might compare ourselves today with that camel driver
of long ago, and asking ourselves the same question, arrive at
virtually the same answers.22 5
Walter Lee McCombs James F. Szaller*
225 Fountain Hearings at 11.
* J.D. The Cleveland State University. This article was written while Mr. Szaller was a
member of the Editorial Board of the Cleveland State Law Review. He is now associated
with the Cleveland law firm of Metzenbaum, Gaines & Stern, Co., L.P.A.
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